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According to many scholars, prosociality, in particular altruism and empathic concern, 
is considered an important motivational factor both in adulthood and in the development 
of morality (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Jensen et al., 2014; Nichols, 2004; Roughley & 
Bayertz, 2019). So far, a large number of studies have addressed the development of 
children’s first-party prosociality and their third-party understanding of moral norms 
separately. In particular, there is much evidence that during the second year of life, 
young children develop empathic concern and sympathy for others in need in prosocial 
situations (Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2012). Moreover, recent findings suggest that 
18-month-old infants already show some rudimentary forms of norm understanding in 
at least dyadic conventional situations. This rudimentary norm understanding is 
interpreted as second-personal normative expectations (Schmidt et al., 2019). Finally, 3-
year-old children not only have descriptive expectations about morality, but also 
normative ones as suggested by their enforcement of moral norms as unaffected 
bystanders (Rakoczy et al., 2016; Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011). However, 
the interrelation between prosociality and morality, in particular the prosocial 
motivational source of the early sense of morality remains unclear. 
This thesis aimed to investigate the developmental origins of morality in young 
children. In particular, it examines the relation between the two main aspects of 
uniquely human cooperation – prosociality and morality – from a developmental 
perspective. These two aspects are of particular importance, not only because they each 
play a key role in maintaining the unique human capacity for large-scale cooperation 
(Tomasello, 2016, 2018) but also because of their close relation to each other (Batson, 
2010; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Nichols, 2004). The present thesis therefore focused on 
three guiding questions that are essential for the ontogeny of morality and its relation to 
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young children’s prosocial (altruistic) motivation to understand, adhere to, and enforce 
moral norms: (1) What are the developmental origins of morality? (2) What is the 
underlying prosocial motivation for children's normative appreciation of morality? (3) 
What is the scope of morality? 
Study 1 investigated the developmental origins of morality in 18-month-old 
infants. A novel eye-tracking paradigm (anticipatory looking, pupil dilation) was used 
to examine whether infants differentiate between prototypical moral (harmful) and 
conventional (harmless) violations. In a between-subjects-design, children watched the 
same video clip whose audio stream differed according to condition. In the first two 
(conventional) conditions, an instructor told an observer to destroy a picture with a 
particular tool chosen from two available tools (tool A: conventional violation 
condition; tool B: no violation condition). In the moral violation condition, the 
instructor forbade the observer to destroy the picture at all. In all three conditions, the 
observer then grasped tool B and destroyed the picture, which led to three different 
(violation) situations. Infants differentiated between two types of conventional norm 
situations in their anticipatory looking. Moreover, they showed a larger relative increase 
in pupil dilation in response to a moral violation than to a conventional violation. These 
findings suggest that 18-month-old infants have third-party descriptive expectations 
about the distinction between conventional and moral violation situations. Moreover, 
they provide the first evidence that empathic concern may be a decisive capacity for the 
distinction between these two violation situations.  
Study set 2 looked at the underlying prosocial motivation for the appreciation of 
morality as a normative notion in 3-year-old children. In three experiments, children 
were given a third-party fairness task (which varied across experiments) and two 
different prosocial tasks. To investigate whether the children have a proper norm 
understanding of fairness by looking not only at norm adherence, but also at norm 
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enforcement, a spontaneous protest paradigm was used. In Experiment 1, children 
protested and corrected unequal (but not equal) allocations, suggesting a normative 
understanding of third-party fairness. Experiment 2 assessed whether children’s 
normative expectations about fairness have a moral (authority-independent) dimension. 
To do so, children observed a distributor who followed (unequal condition) or violated 
(equal condition) an authority’s command to allocate resources unequally. Again, 
despite the authority’s dictate to act unequally, children protested more against unequal 
versus equal allocations. In Experiment 3, results show that children enforced fairness 
norms by altruistic punishment in the sense of restorative justice. While in Experiment 1 
and 2 I found a positive relation of protest behavior and emotional sharing (empathic 
concern), in Experiment 3 children’s altruistic punishment was associated with their 
own costly sharing behavior (altruism). 
Finally, in Study 3, I explored the scope of morality (looking at equal treatment) 
in 5-to 6-year-old children in a typical intergroup context. Here, I investigated whether 
decategorization – a candidate mechanism to overcome in-group bias by emphasizing 
the individual person – would lead preschoolers to treat in-group and out-group 
members equally when sharing resources in a dictator game. I found that preschoolers 
shared more resources with an in-group than with an out-group recipient when social 
category membership was emphasized. When individuating information was 
emphasized (decategorization), however, children shared the same with in-group and 
out-group individuals. 
Taken together, the empirical studies of this dissertation provide a novel 
overview of the prosocial roots of children's developing morality. In particular, the 
present findings suggest that (1) the ability to feel sympathy may be critical for the 
development of the moral-conventional distinction and that 18-month-old infants, at 
minimum, have third-party descriptive expectations about that distinction. (2) The 
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ontogeny of fairness norms can be characterized as moral in that it is associated with 3-
year-old children’s developing concern for the welfare of others in different contexts. 
(3) The presentation of out-group members as individuals may be a powerful tool to 
reduce in-group bias and to foster equal treatment (an important moral category) of in-
group and out-group members in 5- to 6-year-old preschool children.  
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1. General Introduction 
I would like to begin with the following story that once happened to me: my husband 
had broken his arm and could not help with our weekly groceries. He could carry little 
things, but lifting a crate of water was impossible. When we walked back from the 
grocery store to our apartment, he had a small carrier bag with him and I carried the 
crate of water. It was so heavy that I doubted whether I could carry it all the way home. 
I almost wanted to leave the heavy load behind. Then, suddenly out of nowhere a 
helping hand grabbed the other side of the crate from behind. I wondered what was 
going on and turned around. A woman looked at me compassionately and carried the 
purchase together with me without saying much until we arrived at the entrance of our 
house. She briefly said goodbye and continued on her way. Something that amazed me 
and which I will remember forever is her great helpfulness towards a stranger. We did 
not know each other, and we knew that we would not meet again after the event, thus 
she could not expect me to “pay her back” in any way. Therefore, I wondered, what was 
the motivation behind her helpful behavior? Was it a conventional reason, because we 
have learned to be helpful, in meeting some normative standards? Was it for the sake of 
maintaining a good reputation, in the hope that other people would notice her as a 
helpful person? Or because she just wanted to feel better and didn't have to endure the 
suffering? Did she help because she cared about my well-being and therefore it was 
really about morality? This leads me to another question: why should I care about her 
motivation at all, if she helped me in the end? 
From a philosophical point of view, there are various assumptions as to whether the 
outcome of an action (consequentialist ethics) or an action itself (deontological ethics) 
is considered morally relevant, as per Kant, Bentham or Mill, to name a few (Alexander 
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& Moore, 2016). In contrast to the consequentialist ethics (maximization of the "good": 
e.g., helping leads to good feelings for both the helper and the person in need), 
deontologists believe that an action must be consistent with moral principles, regardless 
of what is the best outcome for the most people. Therefore, moral norms must be 
followed by every moral agent and not simply maximized. In this sense, "the right" 
should always take precedence over "the good". Thus, if helping is a moral norm, it 
should be applied to all moral agents, regardless of whether it brings the greatest benefit 
to everyone involved. 
In this thesis, however, I will focus more on the underlying psychological 
motivation behind moral agency. Daniel Batson, who studied altruistic helping, argued 
as follows: being a moral person depends on the interest the other person pursues to 
help. Consequently, his main interest was to find out whether the help was out of selfish 
or altruistic motives. In his empathy-altruism hypothesis, he stated: 
Reducing the need of a person for whom one feels empathy is likely to enable 
the helper to gain social and self-rewards, avoid social and self-punishments, 
and reduce feelings of personal distress. But […] feeling empathy for the 
person in need evokes motivation to help in which these benefits to self are 
not the ultimate goal of helping; they are unintended consequences (Batson & 
Shaw 1991, p. 114). 
In line with these considerations, the ultimate goal, pure help, cannot be interpreted as 
morally right or wrong, but the motivation behind the helping behavior can. In this 
context, a morally relevant (altruistic) act means that the ultimate goal is to increase 
another's well-being. Selfish motives, on the other hand, should be subordinated or 
excluded. Importantly, other-regarding concerns, which the moral sentimentalists David 
Hume and Adam Smith described as sympathy for the other in need, play a decisive role 
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in acting out of the right moral reasons (Kauppinen, 2018). To get back to the woman 
who helped me: she looked compassionate and there were no other obvious selfish 
motives. So perhaps her help was motivated by an altruistic (moral) motivation. 
What about children? Do they – compared to other animal species – possess the 
capacity for prosocial motivation and moral agency? Many animal species are capable 
of cooperative (prosocial) behavior, such as fish, ants and bees. Even our closest living 
primate relatives, the chimpanzees, show some restricted forms of collaboration. Could 
one assume that their behavior is moral? Their main interest to cooperate is to maintain 
their own genes, therefore they cooperate with genetically related others, but 
cooperation with unrelated others is unlikely to occur (Kelly & Thibaut, 1979; Nowak, 
2006; Trivers, 1971). With nonrelatives, collaboration is especially useful when 
individuals are interdependent, as happens to humans when maintaining a peaceful 
group life in the cultural community. Indeed, human cooperation is unique in the animal 
kingdom. From an evolutionary point of view, compared to other animal species, 
humans are ultra-social beings who even cooperate with nonkin (de Waal, 2008; 
Hoffman, 2000; Tomasello, 2016, 2018). According to the cooperation theory of moral 
development (Tomasello, 2016, 2018), there are two ontogenetic steps in children’s 
early moral development: beginning with second-personal prosociality in the second 
year of life which turns to norm-based morality around the age of three. This suggests 
that even our children can already engage in moral behavior. But there is much evidence 
that children are not only able to act cooperatively in a second-personal context (joint 
action, joint intentionality), but also understand morally relevant situations from a third-
person perspective, at least in a descriptive sense earlier than is currently assumed, even 
starting in their second year of life (Schmidt et al., 2019). Thus, this thesis examines 
specifically the relation of the two main aspects of the uniquely human cooperation – 
prosociality and morality – from a developmental point of view. In particular, I 
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investigate what constitutes the prosocial (altruistic) motivation of children to 
understand, adhere to, and enforce moral norms. 
In Chapter 1, I introduce prosociality, by focusing on altruism and empathic 
concern. I then give an overview of the characteristics and the nature of morality, 
regarding morality as a social normative phenomenon. Next, I describe the relation 
between prosociality and morality, in particular the prosocial motivational aspects of 
morality. Thereafter, I give an empirical overview of the development of both aspects. 
Chapters 2-4 present my empirical studies. Finally, Chapter 5 closes with a general 





Prosocial behavior is defined as voluntary behavior that is intended to benefit others, 
such as sharing, helping, or comforting another (Eisenberg et al., 2015). Prosociality is 
not only important for interactions between members of a particular group, but also a 
decisive motivation in intergroup contexts, in which the ultimate goal is not one’s own 
welfare or the welfare of other specific group members who benefit, but instead the 
welfare of the group as a whole (Batson, 2010; Dawes et al., 1988; Tajfel, 1982; Turner 
et al., 1994). 
In addition to situational factors, scientists have always been interested in whether 
specific personality traits are responsible for human prosociality (Batson, 2010; Batson 
& Shaw, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987; Eisenberg et al., 2015; Hoffman, 2000; Jensen et 
al., 2014; Nichols, 2004). In summary, these different explanations can be traced back 
to two separate considerations: (1) people act prosocially on the basis of a voluntary 
intrinsic motivation, out of the genuine interest in the well-being of others and through 
internalized values, goals and rewards, or (2) people need external incentives and act 
predominantly based on hidden selfish strategies such as avoiding punishment and 
social exclusion. In the following paragraph, the first consideration, defined as 
psychological altruism, is discussed (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). 
According to Batson (Batson, 2010; Batson & Shaw, 1991), psychological altruism 
is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare, and is 
therefore contrary to psychological egoism, a motivational state with the ultimate goal 
of increasing one’s own welfare. Following the assumption that altruism is primarily 
about other-regarding concerns, many psychologists (e.g., Andreoni, 1990) also 
describe the motivation as (impurely) altruistic when the prosocial act is completed 
because a person is either intrinsically rewarded (the warm glow effect), avoids feeling 
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guilt, or feels less aversive aroused caused by witnessing someone else's suffering. In 
line with such considerations of both egotistical and altruistic motivations behind 
prosociality, many philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich 
Nietzsche or Jeremy Bentham argued against the possibility of a pure form of altruism 
(Batson, 2010; Waldmann et al., 2012). Altruism strongly contradicts the principle of 
homo economicus, which assumes that people only engage in prosocial behavior if they 
receive something in return (Cialdini et al., 1987). This consideration does not 
necessarily have to be material; it can also refer to affective (experiencing pleasant 
emotions after receiving help) or social (receiving thanks or respect from other people) 
considerations. According to Batson (Batson, 2010; Batson & Shaw, 1991), impure 
altruistic motivation is classified as a relatively subtle form of egoism and therefore is 
not seen as an altruistic act. However, he does not deny the existence of pure altruistic 
motives, like many other philosophers do, such as David Hume, Adam Smith or Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (Waldmann et al., 2012). 
An important role for prosocial behavior is given by empathy. Empathy-related 
processes sometimes motivate altruism but, depending on their nature, they can also 
motivate self-focused behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 2015; 
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Hoffman, 2000). While empathy 
is defined as the mere ability to cognitively and emotionally represent other thoughts 
and feelings (e.g., correctly identifying another person’s internal state or feeling what 
the other person feels), empathic concern and personal distress often result from 
empathy. The cognitive ability to correctly perceive another person’s internal state is 
defined as empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993). Feeling as another person feels is referred 
to as emotional contagion, or affective resonance (de Waal, 2008; Hatfield et al., 1994). 
Empathic concern is associated with altruistic, other-oriented emotions, in that it 
involves feeling for the other person in need. It includes emotions such as sympathy, 
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compassion or tenderness. Contrary to this, personal distress is defined as a self-
focused, aversive emotional response to another’s distress and is associated with 
egotistic motivation. Three possible egotistic prosocial motivations have been 
identified: (1) aversive-arousal reduction (reducing negative emotions caused by 
witnessing another in need), (2) punishment avoidance and (3) reward seeking. Taking 
two different emotional states together, the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson & 
Shaw, 1991) claims that only concern felt for a person in need produces altruistic 
motivation to relieve that need. Therefore, personal distress may also be positively 
related to prosocial behavior, but primarily when there is no easier way to reduce one’s 
own distress other than helping another. 
Finally, there are other definitions of altruism which differ from Batson’s 
psychological-motivational notion. First, from an economic point of view (Kelly & 
Thibaut, 1979; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971), (behavioral) altruism is equated with 
costly sharing or helping behavior (actions that benefit others and not oneself) 
regardless of underlying motives. Secondly, evolutionary altruism differs from 
psychological altruism, in that evolutionary altruism exhibits behavior that reduces 





Before starting to describe morality as special social normative phenomena, certain key 
features of normativity should be defined (for an overview, see Schmidt & Rakoczy, 
2018, 2019). Normative phenomena can usually belong to either practical or epistemic 
normativity (Engel, 2011; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2018). Practical norms refer to and give 
reason for human actions. They are therefore part of human cultural practices and 
values. Epistemic norms describe human beliefs. They give reasons to believe certain 
things and are thus fundamental to our theoretical reasoning, cultural knowledge and 
understanding of truth. The focus here is on practical norms and in particular moral 
norms as social normative phenomena. 
First, when phenomena in social interactions are classified as normative, then 
typically the observed actions are compared with an ideal standard of that action. This 
leads to standards of correctness, with which the concrete action can be assessed as right 
or wrong (Hechter & Opp, 2001; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2018). Norms are valid in both 
general and agent-independent ways (Nagel, 1986). This implies that everyone involved 
in the social practice (including oneself) is expected to adhere to these norms under the 
same conditions. Norms have a binding force and authority over all members of a 
particular community (Korsgaard, 1996; Roughley & Bayertz, 2019; Schmidt & 
Rakoczy, 2018). Thus, norms – as learned behavioral standards – are applied, regulated 
and created among members of our cultural community, which ultimately leads to 
peaceful group life and large-scale cooperation even with nonrelated others. Important 
for a proper norm understanding is not only the acceptance of certain rules, but also the 
development of strategies to enforce the rules by normative agents, for example through 
sanctions or rewards (Brandom, 1994; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2018, 2019; Searle, 2010). 
At the least, third-party norm enforcement is considered a key mechanism in the 
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evolution of human cooperation: by following a deontic modality, humans have 
normative expectations about how people “ought” to act in certain situations (Chudek & 
Henrich, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Normative expectations are distinct from 
descriptive expectations about how people will behave. Descriptive expectations are 
thought to have a mind-to-world direction of fit (similar to epistemic states describing 
how reality is), while normative expectations are thought to describe a world-to-mind 
direction of fit (similar to volitional states and desires; Christen & Glock, 2012; 
Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2018, 2019; Searle, 2010). Finally, norms typically apply in one 
context but not in another. Examples of context-relativity are conventional agreements, 
such as traffic rules (driving on the right or left side of the road) or dress codes (wearing 
black at a funeral). However, moral norms are also context-dependent in the sense that 
there is a hierarchical order as to which of these norms appears to be most important in 
a particular situation (Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2018). Now that the key features of social 
normative phenomena have been described, I will turn my focus to moral norms. 
Moral norms are usually described as prototypical for social norms: they are defined 
as the understanding of others’ welfare, justice and rights, and thus have a non-arbitrary 
character due to the serious consequences of the norm violations (e.g., harm of another 
person ; Nichols, 2004; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2019; Turiel, 1983). According to social 
domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 2006), people distinguish moral norms from arbitrary 
conventional norms (e.g., agreements, customs or rules) using the following criteria: 
both norms are generally permissible, but only moral norms should be adhered to under 
all circumstances (generalizability), they are valid even if an authority orders a violation 
of the norm (authority contingency) and violations are considered to be more severe 
(seriousness) than when disregarding conventions. Thus, moral norms carry the most 
normative weight and violations are seen as more deserving of punishment than when 
disregarding conventions.  
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Fairness norms as part of moral norms are, from many points of view, an important 
factor in the maintenance of cooperation and morality (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Fehr 
et al., 2008; Nowak, 2006; Tomasello, 2016). On the psychological level, acting out of 
fairness principles is contrary to acting out of selfish motives, as it is potentially 
motivated by concern for the well-being of others (psychological altruism). At the 
evolutionary level, fairness as a cost-benefit calculation is often associated with costs to 
oneself and benefits to others (biological altruism). A number of different forms of 
fairness are distinguished: distributive justice, procedural justice and interactive justice 
(Feinberg, 2017; Kane, 1996). Depending on the situation, different principles of 
distributive justice are regarded as fair (Feinberg, 2017; Kane, 1996; Rawls, 1999). 
According to the principle of merit, a fair distribution should be based on individual 
contributions. For example, the person who has shown more effort will receive more 
goods. The principle of equality means that all relevant persons receive an equal 
distribution. A good example of this is Rawl's thought experiment, "Veils of Ignorance" 
(Rawls, 1999), in which individual status (including one's own identity) and 
contributions to the community are difficult to identify because all group members are 
considered anonymous. As a consequence, people tend to treat everyone equally in the 
end because nothing is known about the other (or oneself). Finally, the need principle 
explains that fairness is measured by whether a person's specific needs are taken into 
account when making a decision. For example, the person who is poor or hungry 




1.3. The Relationship between Prosociality and Morality 
There are a variety of different theories about the relationship between prosociality and 
morality (for an overview, see Roughley, 2018). Due to the thematic focus of my work I 
will address only three explanatory approaches. In the following I will first summarize 
the cooperation theory of morality (Tomasello, 2016, 2018). Then I will compare it with 
theories that are in line with moral sentimentalism (Charles Darwin, Adam Smith, 
David Hume, Shaun Nichols, Daniel Batson), which focus on sympathy as an important 
prosocial motivation for morality, as well as theories that focus more on the broader 
emotional components of moral judgments as alternative explanations (Jonathan Haidt, 
Joshua Greene). 
Tomasello believes that the development of morality must take into account not 
only that altruistic behavior acts as a driving force, but that morality primarily requires 
"mutual respect" between individuals, which is based on self-other equivalence 
regarding role fulfillment in collaborative activities (Tomasello, 2016). Most 
importantly, he sees this capacity as the genesis of the key normative concept of 
morality, which develops in three steps (Roughley, 2018; Tomasello, 2016). The first 
step is the “you > me” formula, which represents early humans’ (and great apes’) 
morality of sympathy. That is, the pre-moral capacity of prosociality and in particular 
altruism and empathic concern for the welfare of others between kin and friends, where 
(biological) costs are not too great. The second step is the “you = me” formula, which 
represents, in particular, the fundamental capacity of early humans’ morality of fairness. 
That is, a kind of impartiality, deriving from the recognition of self-other equivalence, 
in which every partner deserves equal rights. However, the capacity of mutual respect 
and deservingness is limited to a partner in second-personal, interdependent, 
collaborative interactions. Finally, the third step is the “we > me” formula, which 
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represents the full-blown capacity for morality in an agent-neutral sense. In line with 
that, the key new attitudes of joint agency are “respect”, “resentment” and “guilt”, and 
joint agency is transformed from small-scale to large-scale interactions, from local 
“responsibilities” and “deservingness” into fully fledged moral obligations (Roughley, 
2018; Tomasello, 2016, 2018). When looking at the ontogeny of morality in humans, 
children are not only passive recipients of social information, but rather they are shaped 
by the social world in which they live. They take on an active role in learning when and 
how to cooperate through interaction with parents, peers and communities. Tomasello 
claims that the capacity of shared intentionality (which only humans seem to possess) is 
the key ability not only for the development of social cognition but also for morality 
(Tomasello, 2016, 2018; Tomasello et al., 2005, 2012). In his interdependence 
hypothesis (Tomasello et al., 2012) he defines shared intentionality as the capacity to 
share intentions in a "we"-mode (to think and act as "we" rather than just "I"), which 
develops in two steps from second-personal joint intentionality to group-based 
collective intentionality. According to the cooperation theory of moral development 
(Tomasello, 2018), morality is a special form of cooperation that also develops in two 
ontogenetic steps: from second-personal (pre-moral) cooperative and collaborative 
behavior to fully fledged objective moral capacities. Beginning with second-personal 
actions, collaborative behavior takes place in the direct interaction between two persons, 
such as a child and an adult acting together towards a shared goal (e.g., Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2007). At around the age of three, children’s cooperative behavior takes a 
normative turn, from “[…] what the child wants to do and wants others to do to what 
she and others ought, should, or must do” (Tomasello, 2018, p. 249). At this age, 
children begin to understand that norm agreements are not only directly linked to a 
particular person in second-personal actions, but should be applied independently to 
each member of a community (agent-neutral norm understanding). Children are now 
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able to understand that norms have a binding force for all members of the group and 
that we as a group are responsible for these norms (Tomasello, 2016).  
Another approach of looking at prosociality and morality is offered by evolutionary 
theories influenced by moral sentimentalists, such as Adam Smith and David Hume 
(Kauppinen, 2018; Roughley, 2018). In contrast to Tomasello’s point of view, David 
Hume and Adam Smith argued that these other-oriented motivations (empathic concern, 
sympathy) especially are the core capacity for altruistic motivation and morality 
(Batson, 2010; Kauppinen, 2018; Maibom, 2017; Waldmann et al., 2012). Clearly 
influenced by Adam Smith's theory of morality, Darwin assumes three "social 
instincts", which are decisive for the development of human morality: sympathy, the 
development of the ability to think, and language (Darwin, 1871; Roughley, 2018). 
Thinking and language enable comparisons over time and across individuals, but 
Darwin saw sympathy as the crucial source of morality. On the one hand, this "other-
oriented" motivation enables early humans to be receptive to the well-being (and 
suffering) of their conspecifics, and on the other hand, it enables them to judge whether 
the moral judgments of others are to be regarded as right or wrong. Darwin associated 
sympathy with an initial immature moral capacity. Only the later component 
"reasoning" led to the understanding that moral values are not only valid within the 
group, but universally (for other nations/animals). With regard to Darwin, however, the 
empirical verification of his hypothesis was largely unexplored. Nevertheless, there is 
much evidence today that the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional 
norms depends not only on a normative agreement determining which actions are 
prohibited, but also on an affective mechanism (Nichols, 2002, 2004; Turiel, 1983, 
2006). In line with that, most theories of moral reasoning acknowledge that emotions 
are an important part of moral judgments (Waldmann et al., 2012). Even Kant in his 
more rationalist theory of morality, claims that moral judgments are typically 
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accompanied by moral feelings (Kant, 1959; Maibom, 2017; Waldmann et al., 2012). 
There is much empirical evidence that affects are deeply intertwined with moral 
reasoning and lead to strong emotional reactions as part of moral judgments (Decety & 
Howard, 2013; Eisenberg et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2014; Killen & Smetana, 2015; 
Nichols, 2002; Smetana et al., 2014). Not only mere empathy (feeling what the other 
person feels), but especially other-orientated feelings (sympathy, compassion, 
tenderness, softheartness) play a decisive role in judging harmful transgressions as 
wrong (Nichols, 2002).  
However, according to some scholars, other negative emotions such as disgust or 
personal distress are also associated with moral norm violations (Batson & Shaw, 1991, 
1991; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt et al., 1993; Nichols, 2002, 2004). For example, 
Joshua Greene (e.g., Greene, 2001) describes emotional and cognitive dispositions as 
indicators of moral obligations. Greene’s model is therefore based on the dual-process 
theory, in which automatic emotional processes (System 1) interact with conscious and 
slow reflective processes (System 2). As a consequence of early human cooperation in 
small-scale interactions, specific emotional dispositions initially developed that lead one 
to react strongly to violent or uncooperative behavior (Roughley, 2018). Moreover, 
cognitive reflective abilities developed later in the evolution of human morality. These 
innate human emotional dispositions belong to System 1, which are initially activated 
automatically in moral situations. Somewhat later, in the reflective examination of 
moral situations, System 1 is replaced by System 2. Similar to Joshua Greene’s theory is 
Jonathan Haidt's theory of moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). As a social 
intuitionist approach to morality, he describes that moral judgments are formed by fast 
emotional moral intuitions (such as disgust), whereas moral thinking is formed as 




Taking all findings together, the above approaches contrast with the rationalist work 
of Piaget and Kohlberg on moral development, which they regard as a primarily 
cognitive activity (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Roughley & Bayertz, 2019; Waldmann et 
al., 2012). Most importantly, however, prosociality and morality are not only two 
separate ontogenetic steps in the evolution of human morality, but rather they are also 
heavily interrelated, with prosocial motivation and, in particular, sympathy playing a 




1.4. The Early Development of Human Morality: An Empirical 
Overview 
There is much evidence that babies are already attuned to the social world around them 
and attend to the needs, emotions and mental states of others (Grossmann & Johnson, 
2007). For example, even right after birth, newborns prefer real faces to other facial 
objects (Leo et al., 2018; Morton & Johnson, 1991). In the first year of life, infants 
acquire more social skills through the exchange with their environment. However, this 
exchange is mainly limited to simple dyadic interactions, in which the infant either 
interacts with an object, such as a ball, or refers primarily to its caregiver, for example 
when the mother smiles at the child and the child smiles back (Bakeman & Adamson, 
1984). 
A milestone in social-cognitive development is reached between the ninth and 
twelfth months of life. Infants begin to understand more and more that other people act 
based on goals, intentions and plans (Tomasello et al., 2005). As soon as the child 
realizes that other people are actors with mental states (such as intentions), the first 
triadic interactions begin. Triadic interactions take place between the child and an adult 
who jointly focuses his or her attention on an object, person or event. This moment is 
seen as an entry into social community life and is the basis for cultural learning – now 
things in the world can be experienced together. For the first time, children have a “we-
intentionality" and understand that other people can be used as interaction partners with 
whom mental states can be shared. Thus, children increasingly use pointing gestures, 
such as declarative pointing, as a pre-linguistic means of communication to point out 
events to other people and to initiate joint attention. In one study, Liszkowski and 
colleagues (Liszkowski et al., 2004) observed that 12-month-old babies repeatedly drew 
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the experimenter's attention to a certain object via pointing gestures (e.g. a doll suddenly 
appearing from behind a curtain) in order to experience an event together.  
During the second year of life, children begin to cooperate with other people 
through the acquired ability of joint attention, the setting of joint goals and the ability to 
share intentions. Understanding and sharing intentions is essential not only in joint 
actions, but also in the development of prosocial behavior (Tomasello, 2016). Parents 
and educators increasingly observe how their children no longer only take care of their 
own interests, but increasingly of the well-being of others as well. This special ability 
brings enormous advantages, not only for the community life, but also for the individual 
development. Prosocial behavior is an important component for acceptance among 
peers, self-confidence and emotion regulation (Paulus & Moore, 2012). The study of 
children’s developing prosocial behavior starts long before children actually begin to act 
prosocially themselves. A plethora of studies show that 6- and 9-month-old infants 
demonstrate that they also prefer those who have helped others and selectively avoid 
agents with harmful intentions (Hamlin et al., 2011). The first signs of children’s own 
helping behavior is evident from about 14 to 18 months of age, as numerous studies on 
instrumental help have shown (e.g., Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). The 
researchers designed various out of reach situations in which an investigator needed 
help to reach a specific goal. For example, the children watched an experimenter drop a 
clothespin while hanging up laundry, or he stood in front of a closed cabinet door and 
could not open it to put a pile of books in. This sensitivity towards others’ needs extends 
into the second year of life, in which children’s prosocial attention has transformed into 
an intrinsic motivation to see others helped. Findings on the overjustification effect give 
further evidence of the prosocial motivation theory, whereby initially intrinsically 
motivated children were less willing to help in the future with the prospect of material 
reward (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, further findings revealed that 
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children are happier and smile more when others’ needs are fulfilled, even when this 
involves a material cost to themselves (Aknin et al., 2015). Not only is the child's own 
behavior decisive, but parenting style also plays an important role in the development of 
children's prosociality. Dahl (2015) showed that parents increasingly responded with 
praise to their children's helping behavior in order to encourage the children to help. In 
particular, those children who were encouraged more at the beginning of their second 
year of life helped more often at the end of their second year. In addition, Brownell, 
Svetlova, Anderson, Nichols, and Drummond (2013) investigated parenting behavior in 
parents of 18- to 30-month-old children and found that parents of more helpful children 
also tended to encourage them to name and explain people's emotions in picture books. 
Interestingly, it was not the explanations of the parents that correlated with the 
children's helping behavior, but the questions that encouraged them to think and 
empathize. 
From early on, humans are at least rudimentarily able to put themselves in other 
people's shoes, which is also evident on an affective level, such as in emotional 
contagion. For example, babies cry when other babies cry – but not when they hear their 
own crying or other loud sounds (Dondi et al., 1999; Simner, 1971). This automatic and 
involuntary mood transmission has evolutionary significance; for example, to 
synchronize emotions and behavior within a group and to react quickly to danger. 
However, emotional contagion does not necessarily motivate prosocial behavior, rather 
empathic concern seems to be decisive (Batson & Shaw, 1991). In line with the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis, various studies give evidence that altruistic motivations 
(empathic concern) rather than egotistic motives are associated with moral issues, using 
different experimental methods like heart rate, facial expressions and self-report 
(Eisenberg et al., 1990; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990), neurobiological studies (Hastings, 
Miller, Kahle, & Zahn-Waxler, 2014; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & 
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Rhee, 2008) or behavioral measurements (Hepach et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2009). 
Recently, pupillometry has proven to be particularly suitable for measuring emotional 
arousal in young children, by showing that the pupil dilate more in prosocial situations 
(Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2017). Finally, individual differences in dispositional trait 
sympathy but not in personal distress also tend to positively correlate with prosocial 
behavior (Eisenberg et al., 2014, 2015; Malti et al., 2012). 
According to many scholars, a necessary prerequisite for empathic concern is 
children’s own self-awareness, measured by the rouge test (Amsterdam, 1972). From 
about 18 months, the children are able to recognize themselves in the mirror by 
touching their face – not the mirror – to remove a dot on their nose. Self-awareness 
leads to the knowledge of being able to separate oneself from one's environment. This 
self-other distinction allows us to empathize with others while at the same time 
differentiating our own feelings from those of others. Findings show that there is a 
connection between empathy and self-recognition in 15- to 24-month-olds, measured by 
the so-called Teddy Test (Bischof-Köhler, 1993). Results showed that the children react 
very differently to the experimenter because his teddy was damagede: from empathic 
helpers, who even comforted him, to egocentrically emotionally infected children, who 
cried out of personal distress, to children who were confused or uninvolved, apathetic to 
the events and who did not react at all. Self-awareness thus seems to have an important 
influence on the development of empathic concern and compassion, as well as on 
helpfulness and consolation. On the other hand, recent evidence suggests an early 
capacity for empathic concern in the first year of life, which is more associated with 
implicit forms of self-awareness (Davidov et al., 2013; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). In 
particular, the researchers observed that 8- to 10-month-old children were concerned 
about the discomfort of their mother, who had suffered pain due to an unintentional 
hammer blow to her fingers. Results revealed individual differences in the ability to 
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empathize among the 10-month-old babies that was associated with later prosocial 
behavior at the ages of 12 and 14 months.  
There is much evidence for an early rudimentary form of general norm 
understanding in infants during their second year of life. A recent study (Schmidt et al., 
2019) provides evidence not only for descriptive expectations of appropriate social 
behavior but also for a more concrete but simpler form of norm understanding, at least 
in dyadic interactions. Results revealed that even 18-month-old infants intervened, 
corrected, and directed a puppet more in the normative than in the non-normative 
conditions. Thus, infants showed so-called second-personal normative expectations (an 
interpersonal “we” that regulates both “you” and “me”) about their partner’s behavior in 
a triadic interaction (“You should do X!”). Importantly, these simple normative 
expectations will later become group-minded impersonal and abstract forms of a social 
norm understanding (Nagel, 1986; Tomasello, 2016; Turiel, 1983). At the age of 3, 
children then take a normative turn in which social second-personal interactions are 
transformed by a developing understanding of normative standards of particular groups 
(Tomasello, 2018). Social (moral and conventional) norms are then not only adequately 
followed but also defended by children reacting to norm violations of others. For 
example, such studies show that 3-year olds intervene and protest against moral norm 
violations in a variety of contexts such as harm, fairness or property rights (Rakoczy et 
al., 2016; Rossano et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2013; Vaish et al., 2011). In addition to 
behavioral studies, a number of interview studies support the results in which children 
of different age groups were asked about their judgments of moral and conventional 
violations (Smetana, 1981, 1984; Smetana et al., 1993; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). The 
results revealed that children under the age of 3 could not yet distinguish between 
morality and convention. Children who were more advanced in their language skills, 
however, were more able to do so. Against this background, a recent study investigated 
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the evaluations of moral and conventional violations of 2- to 5-year-old children by 
adding a behavioral puppet task to the language-driven explicit judgment tasks 
(Smetana et al., 2018). The results show that even the two-year-olds differentiated 
correctly between the moral and conventional situations and that they acted less 
prosocial to moral norm violators than to conventional norm violators. The younger 
children could not pass all tasks correctly.  
The development of fairness norms has long been a topic of interest. Many 
empirical findings have shown that even infants have at minimum descriptive 
expectations about, and preferences for equality in resource allocation (Geraci & Surian, 
2011; Meristo et al., 2016), and that third-party expectations of fairness are closely 
interrelated with infants’ own (first-party) morally relevant sharing behavior (Schmidt 
& Sommerville, 2011). In a recent study, Rakoczy and colleagues (Rakoczy et al., 
2016) found that 3- and 5-year-olds protested against unfair, merit-based resource 
allocation decisions in a paradigm involving collaboration among the children, both 
when children are affected and when they are disinterested observers. Furthermore, 
there are a great number of developmental studies that choose costly punishment to 
investigate children’s reactions to unfair behavior (Kenward & Östh, 2012; Krasnow et 
al., 2016; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015). Such 
studies show that even preschool children use costly punishment and sacrifice their own 
resources to punish unfair behavior. This suggests that by 3 years of age, children have 
some normative expectations, in particular about equality in resource allocation. 
Although 3-year-old children have a certain sense of justice, only older children 
between the ages of 5 to 8 understand more complex relationships, such as legitimate 
reasons for an unequal distribution, such as merit, need or agreements (Schmidt, 
Svetlova, et al., 2016). 
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Finally, the development of morality is not limited to the particular in-group, but is 
also an important factor in intergroup contexts. Children show explicit and implicit 
preferences for members of their own language group, gender (Shutts, 2015) and race 
(Dunham et al., 2008). A plethora of developmental investigations focuses on social 
categorization processes. Such studies show that intergroup-bias already occurs at the 
age of 3 and more robustly at the age of 5 in minimal group settings (Dunham et al., 
2011), manifested in various prosocial forms like sharing or helping behavior (Benozio 
& Diesendruck, 2015; Fehr et al., 2008; Over, 2018; Sierksma et al., 2018) or in trust 
and loyalty (Misch et al., 2016; Rutland et al., 2015). Recent studies even pointed to an 





1.5. Focus of the Dissertation and Methodological Approach 
The general aim of this thesis was to examine young children’s developmental origins 
of morality. Thus, two aspects – prosociality and morality – are of particular 
importance, not only because they are thought to play a key role in maintaining the 
unique human capacity for large-scale cooperation (even with nonrelatives) but also 
because of their close relation to each other. A large number of studies have addressed 
the development of children’s first-party prosociality and their third-party understanding 
of moral norms separately, but little is known about their interrelation to each other. 
Therefore, I examined three research questions that are essential for understanding the 
ontogeny of morality and its interrelation with young children’s prosocial (altruistic) 
motivation to understand, adhere to, and enforce moral norms within their own and 
between different groups. 
(1) What are the developmental origins of morality? There is much evidence that 
children in their second year of life develop empathic concern and sympathy for others 
in need in both prosocial and morally relevant situations. Moreover, recent findings 
suggest that 18-month-old children already show some rudimentary forms of norm 
understanding in at least dyadic conventional situations, which are interpreted as 
second-personal normative expectations about how a partner in a dyad should act rather 
than an abstract and group-wide impersonal understanding of norms that develops 
around the third year of life. Thus, I assume that both the capacity to feel sympathy and 
the ability for third-party descriptive expectations enable infants to differentiate 
between simple conventional and moral violations without having a full-blown 
normative and agent-neutral understanding of norms yet. 
(2) What is the underlying motivation for children's normative appreciation of 
morality? In particular, I am interested in the role of altruism and sympathy as important 
33 
 
motivational factors in the development of fairness norms by investigating the relation 
between young children's first-party prosociality and their third-party normative 
expectations about fairness. 
(3) What is the scope of morality (i.e., children’s sharing behavior in an intergroup 
context)? There is much evidence that preschool children show in-group favoritism. 
That is, preferring members of their own group over members of other groups which is 
particularly evident in their prosocial (sharing) behavior. However, the extent to which 
specific mechanisms leads to reversing the effect and ultimately to equal treatment of 
both groups (equality as a major moral category) has not yet been clarified. 
All three studies were conducted with different methods and measures to allow for a 
broader picture of the ontogeny of morality and the role of prosociality in this process. 
In Study 1, a novel eye-tracking paradigm was designed using anticipatory looking as a 
non-verbal measure to examine infants’ third-party descriptive expectations and pupil 
dilation as a measure of their physiological arousal in response to moral and 
conventional violation situations. In Study Set 2, in Experiments 1 and 2, fairness 
violations were committed in a third-party protest paradigm with hand-puppets to allow 
for the assessment of young children’s spontaneous verbal utterances and behavioral 
interventions as a standardized measurement for children’s (agent-neutral, moral) norm 
understanding. In Experiment 3, I used a costly punishment paradigm with stickers. 
Moreover, in all three experiments, children’s first-party prosocial behavior was 
measured with a simplified costly sharing behavior (altruism) paradigm and an emotion 
sharing (empathic concern) paradigm. In Study 3, I used a classical dictator game with 
stickers to measure children’s costly sharing behavior in an intergroup context. 
The first two studies addressed the developmental origins of morality within the 
children’s own cultural group (i.e., there were no particular cues of group membership), 
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whereas the third study dealt with the scope of morality in an intergroup context (in-
group/ out-group comparison). 
In Study 1, I investigated the developmental origins of morality in 18-month-old 
infants. The question was whether 18- month-old infants differentiate between 
prototypical moral (harm) and conventional (harmless) violations using Turiel’s (1983, 
2006) social domain theory approach. In a between-subjects-design, children watched 
the very same video clip in three different conditions. In the first two conditions, an 
instructor told an actor to destroy a picture with an upper tool A (conventional violation 
condition) or with a lower tool B (no violation condition), whereas in the third (moral 
violation) condition, the instructor forbade the actor to destroy the picture at all. The 
actor then said he would destroy the picture, grasped the lower tool B, and destroyed the 
picture, resulting either in no norm violation, a conventional violation, or a moral 
violation. I hypothesized that infants would show a larger relative increase in pupil 
dilation in response to a moral violation than to a conventional violation. Moreover, I 
expected infants to differentiate between two types of conventional norm situations in 
their anticipatory looking based on prescribed actions. 
Study set 2 looked at the underlying prosocial motivation for the normative 
appreciation of morality in 3-year-old children. In three experiments, I investigated 
whether the origin of fairness (understood as a normative notion) is mainly seen as a 
convention (agreements, regularities, habits) or whether it is related to moral issues 
(based on concern for the welfare of others), in particular with prosocial tendencies and 
other-regard. Three-year-old children were given a third-party fairness task that varied 
across the experiments and different prosocial tasks. In Experiment 1, I examined 
whether children protested and corrected unequal but not equal allocations without 
given them any cues to act fairly. Experiment 2 assessed whether children’s normative 
expectations about fairness have a moral (authority-independent) dimension. Here, 
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children observed a distributor who followed (unequal condition) or violated (equal 
condition) an authority’s command to allocate resources unequally. In Experiment 3, I 
was interested in whether children enforced fairness norms using altruistic punishment 
in the sense of restorative justice. Moreover, in all three experiments I examined the 
extent to which children’s norm understanding of fairness was associated with their own 
prosocial motivation, measuring children’s costly sharing behavior and emotional 
sharing behavior as a function of their intrinsic motivation to act prosocially. 
Finally, in Study 3, I explored the scope of morality in 5-to 6-year-old children in a 
typical intergroup context. In today’s times of heterogeneous societies and attempts to 
overcome prejudice and xenophobia, it is important to examine not only intergroup-
bias, but also ways to overcome group thinking and foster equal treatment of individuals 
regardless of group membership. Thus, I investigated whether decategorization – a 
candidate mechanism to overcome intergroup bias by emphasizing the individual person 





2. Study 1: 18-month-old Infants Differentiate between 
Moral and Conventional Violations 
2.1. Introduction 
In all human societies, people follow, create and enforce norms. But not only that, even 
children adhere norms and punish other community members who do not abide by the 
agreed upon rules (Göckeritz et al., 2014; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt, Butler, 
et al., 2016; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Not all norm violations are treated alike. 
According to social domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 2006), people differentiate between 
two types of norms. Moral norms are defined as the understanding of others’ welfare, 
fairness and rights (e.g., against harming others) which are differentiated from arbitrary 
conventional norms that provide consensually determined expectations for appropriate 
behavior, such as agreements, customs or rules (e.g. dress codes, classroom 
regularities). A wealth of studies has pointed to an early ability to distinguish between 
moral and conventional norm violations (e.g., Killen & Smetana, 2015; Smetana, 1984; 
Smetana & Braeges, 1990), but it is not yet clear exactly when children will be able to 
do so. 
There is much evidence for an early rudimentary form of norm understanding in 
infancy. In the first two age years, children are capable to use normative evaluations 
(e.g., descriptive third-party fairness expectations; Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo, 
Strid, & Surian, 2016) and that these normative expectations were interrelated with 
children’s own altruistic behavior (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Moreover, a recent 
study (Schmidt et al., 2019) provide evidence not only for descriptive expectations of 
appropriate social behavior but also for a more concrete but simpler form of norm 
understanding in at least dyadic interactions. Results revealed that even 18-month-old 
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infants intervened, corrected, and directed a puppet more in the normative than in the 
non-normative conditions. Thus, infants showed so-called second-personal normative 
expectations (an interpersonal “we” that regulates both “you” and “me”) about their 
partner’s behavior in a triadic interaction (“You should do X!”). Importantly, these 
simple normative expectations will later be scaled up to group-minded impersonal and 
abstract forms of a social norm understanding (Nagel, 1986; Tomasello, 2016; Turiel, 
1983). 
In line with social domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 2006), the ability to distinguish 
between moral and conventional norms depends on a normative agreement that 
determines which actions are prohibited and on an affective mechanism (Nichols, 2002, 
2004). Moral norm violations are seen as more severe and more deserving of 
punishment than disregarding conventions. Even at preschool age moral and 
conventional norms are not only adequately followed but also defended by children 
reacting to norm violations of others. For example, such studies show that around three 
years of age, young children intervene and protest against moral norm violations in a 
variety of contexts such as harm, fairness or property rights (Rakoczy et al., 2016; 
Rossano et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2013; Vaish et al., 2011). In addition to the 
behavioral studies, a number of interview studies supported the results in which children 
of different age groups were asked about their judgments of moral and conventional 
violations (Smetana, 1981, 1984; Smetana et al., 1993; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). The 
results revealed that children under the age of three could not yet distinguish between 
morality and convention. Although children who were more advanced in their language 
skills, were more able to do so. Thus, a recent study investigated the evaluations of 
moral and conventional violations of 2- to 5-year-old children by adding a behavioral 
puppet task to the language-driven explicit judgment tasks (Smetana et al., 2018). The 
results show that even the 2-year-olds differentiated correctly between moral and 
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conventional situations and that they act less prosocial to moral than to conventional 
norm violators. But still the younger children could not pass all tasks correctly. Hence, 
there is much evidence that younger children may already be able to distinguish 
between morality and convention, for example when using non-linguistic tasks. 
Studies with children and adults show that affects are deeply intertwined with 
moral reasoning and lead to strong emotional reactions as part of moral judgments 
(Decety & Howard, 2013; Eisenberg et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2014; Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Nichols, 2002; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 1983). Moreover, there is an ongoing 
debate about whether empathy, sympathy or personal distress lead to these strong 
emotional reactions in moral situations (Batson & Shaw, 1991; de Waal, 2008; 
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). While empathy is defined as the mere ability to cognitively 
and emotionally representing other thoughts and feelings (e.g., feeling what the other 
person feels), sympathy and personal distress often results from empathy (Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1990). According to Batson and Shaw (1991) both personal distress and 
sympathy end in prosocial behavior, but the motivations behind the two constructs are 
different. Sympathy is associated with altruistic, other-oriented motives and involves 
emotions such as concern. Personal distress is defined as a self-focused, aversive 
emotional response to another’s distress and associated with egoistic motivation. 
Therefore, personal distress is positively related to prosocial behavior primarily when 
there is no easier way than helping to reduce one’s own distress. Various studies give 
evidence that altruistic motivations (empathic concern, sympathy) are associated with 
moral issues rather than egoistic motives, using different experimental methods like 
heart rate, facial expressions and self-report (Eisenberg et al., 1990; Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990), neurobiological studies (Hastings, Miller, Kahle, & Zahn-Waxler, 2014; Knafo, 
Zahn-Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008) or behavioral measurements 
(Hepach et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2009).  
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Recently, pupillometry has proven to be particularly suitable for measuring 
emotional arousal in young children, by showing that pupil dilated more in morally 
relevant situations (Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2017). Importantly, physiological 
changes may reflect discrete emotional responses, but on the other hand they also are 
influenced by a wide range of non-emotional factors such as attention, cognition, 
physical activity, or extraneous stimuli (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). For instance, pupil 
size dilated more as sensory response to dark than to bright light, or in cognitive tasks, 
such as increased mental effort (Kahnemann & Beatty, 1967; Sirois & Brisson, 2014; 
Verschoor et al., 2015). Therefore, it is important to exclude and control alternative 
results in pupillometry. Taken together, (i) infants have an early rudimentary form of 
norm understanding at least in dyadic interactions, (ii) methods that rely on linguistic 
abilities may lead to a systematic underestimation of children’s understanding of the 
distinction between morality and convention below three years of age, (iii) and previous 
findings suggest that early third-party descriptive expectations might be the basis for the 
development of understanding conventional norms. Nevertheless, these studies leave 
open, whether infants distinct between conventional and moral violation situations at 
least as descriptive expectations, and moreover whether infants also understand the 
normative force of moral norms on an affective level (empathic concern, sympathy). 
For the present study, we therefore developed a novel eye-tracking paradigm, 
implementing both anticipatory gaze and pupil dilation as measures of affective arousal 
(Hepach et al., 2012, 2017). By using these non-verbal measures, we investigate 
whether 18-month-old infants differentiate between moral (harm) and conventional 
(harmless) violations. 
Since we concurrently measure pupillometry and looking behavior in response to 
movies, we used the exact same visual presentation across three conditions. The type of 
violation varies across conditions by alterations in the speech content of the actor who 
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explained a game. To be sure those infants understand the normative moral and 
conventional directives we decided to use imperatives. In line with our considerations, a 
recent study show, that toddlers are already able to appropriately understand the 
normative structure of imperative speech acts and criticized actors, who disregard the 
instruction of a speaker who explained a directive (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2009). 
Depending on the speech content, the exact same action performed thereafter by the 
observer constituted a conventional norm violation, a moral norm violation or a no 
violation. In the no violation situation, the observer follows the instruction to destroy a 
drawing. In the conventional norm violation situation, the observer reaches the goal (the 
destruction of a drawing) but violates the game instructions by using the wrong tool to 
accomplish it. The moral norm violation situation constitutes a moral norm violation in 
that the observer destroys the instructor’s property while explicitly instructed not to. We 
expected infants to differentiate between the two types of violations in their anticipatory 
looking. Moreover, we hypothesized that infants in the no violation situation would 
predict that the actor grasps the tool she actually grasps thereafter, while infants in the 
conventional violation situation should predict the other tool to be used. In the moral 
violation situation the infants should not have a specific expectation. Second, we 
predicted that infants would show a larger relative increase in pupil dilation in response 
to a moral violation than to the conventional violation situation. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
Seventy-two 18-month-old children (M = 18 months 6 days, Min = 17 month 15 days, 
Max = 19 month 12 days, SD = 0.42, 34 girls) participated in the study. Additionally, 2 
children were excluded due to fussiness and another 9 due to experimenter error. 
Children were recruited through the municipality and received small gifts as 
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compensation. An informed consent and a questionnaire regarding general health and 
development were obtained. The children were all healthy full-term and without pre- or 
perinatal complications. 
2.2.2. Design 
We designed a between-subject eye-tracking experiment in which one of three game 
conditions is presented: a no violation (control-) condition (NVC), a conventional 
violation condition (CVC) and a moral violation condition (MVC). 
2.2.3. Materials 
2.2.3.1. Test Environment and Apparatus 
During the experiment the children sat in a stimulus-poor booth on the lap of their 
caretaker, who was seated in front of the eye tracker apparatus. The distance between 
eyes and apparatus was approximately 65 centimeters (the screen’s viewing angle was 
43.5° by 28.0°). The behavior of the children was monitored online by the experimenter 
from a separate control room by means of a camera located above the eye tracker. A 24 
inch TFT-screen (HP Elite Display E242, 1920 x 1200 pixels, 16:10), equipped with a 
Tobii Pro X3-120 eye tracker (Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Schweden) was used for 
visual and auditory data presentation. The Tobii external processing unit recorded gaze 
data at 120 Hz and pupillary data at 40 Hz. The Tobii X3 has an average accuracy of .4° 
and allows for head movements by the subjects (50x40x40cm). Stimulus presentation 
was controlled by a PC running Tobii Studio® software (version 3.4.8). Prior to the 
eye-tracking experiment the caretakers were instructed not to move after calibration and 
gently hold the child in order to maintain eye tracker alignment, and to entertain the 
infant during the (approximately 1-min) break between calibration and the experiment. 
The caretakers were instructed to look at the children’ head (not at the screen) during 
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calibration and testing. The eye tracker was calibrated with the standard 9-point 
calibration, when this failed to elicit enough attention we used one with a small Tobii 
animation instead. The calibration was accepted with a minimum of seven points 
acquired. Lighting conditions were kept constant across participants. 
2.2.3.2. Stimuli 
The video material consisted of 4 consecutive movies (43.5° x 25.2°, 30 frames/S). To 
standardize luminance across conditions, all three conditions (NVC, CVC and MVC) 
contained exactly the same visual material. Only the voiceover of movie 1 was changed 
across conditions. The number of syllables was kept constant across conditions. The 
volume of the soundtracks was normalized and mastered for equal volume across 
conditions. The Timing of speech was synchronized across conditions. 
2.2.4. Procedure 
Children were tested at a time when they were likely to be alert. After the instruction of 
the caretaker and the calibration, the test phase started with the visual presentation of 
one of the three conditions (Movie 1 - 4). The introduction phase (Movie 1) functioned 
to explain the rules of the game. First, two actors (instructor, observer) introduced 
themselves by name and looked directly in front of the camera to familiarize the 
participants with the actors faces and voices. In the first two conditions, the instructor 
explained to the observer to destroy a picture with an upper tool A (CVC) or with a 
lower tool B (NVC), whereas in the third (MVC) condition, the instructor asked the 
observer not to destroy the picture at all. Pupil dilation was measured during specially 
designed movies. During this phase (Movie 2) the participants saw a red dot that was 
placed in the center of the screen (5 sec animated, 5 sec stationary). Movie 2 was used 
as baseline measurement. In the anticipatory gaze phase (Movie 3) the actor first 
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announced to destroy the picture, followed by a still frame (length 6 sec). The still 
frame was used to test for anticipatory gaze. The test phase ended with the observer 
grasping the lower tool B, and destroyed the picture, resulting either in NVC, CVC, or 
MVC. Finally, a second pupil animation phase (Movie 4) was used as post measurement 
for the pupil diameter. Importantly, Movie 2 und 4 were exactly the same. 
2.2.5. Eye-Tracking Data Handling 
For the predictive looking analysis, we used Tobii Studio ® software (version 3.4.8) to 
aggregate looking times per subject per Areas Of Interest (AOIs) of the first three 
seconds of the still frame. The standard Tobii I-VT fixation algorithm was used to 
define fixations. The AOIs were the same for the time windows tested across all three 
conditions (see supplemental material). Both pincer AOIs were 10.7° by 9.3°, 4.1° 
above and 5.5° below the vertical midline.  
For the pupillary analysis we exported the 40 Hz raw pupillary data per eye from Tobii 
Studio ®. Pupillary data were recorded during the stationary part of movie 2 and 4. The 
red fixation dot’s size was 1.4°. We then applied a number of processing steps using R. 
Firstly, we applied an outlier rejection based on minimum and maximum pupil size: min 
= 1mm, max = 6mm (Verschoor et al., 2013). Then we applied an outlier rejection 
based on the maximum allowed change in pupil size in 25ms, defined as 0.5 mm in 25 
ms (Verschoor et al., 2013). Next we interpolated both the left and the right eye 
according to Hepach et al. (2012) (maximum gap: 3 missing data points). Then data 
from left and right eye were combined by averaging them into one value. If only one of 
those was present, then the present data point was used. Thereafter the combined data 
were interpolated once more using the Hepach procedure (Hepach et al., 2012) 
(maximum gap 3 missing data points), any missing values were removed and a last 
outlier rejection was performed based on the Standard Deviation (SD) of the segment 
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(any values that deviated more than 3 SDs were removed). Lastly, we calculated the 
change in pupil size from movie 2 to 4 by subtracting the mean pupil size of movie 2 
from movie 4. 
2.2.6. Statistical Analysis 
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.6.1. (R Core Team, 2019). Since the two 
dependent measures (anticipatory looking and pupil diameter) violated assumptions of 
standard linear models (i.e., normally distributed errors), we each calculated a 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with gaussian error structure. For all GLMs 
likelihood ratio tests (LRT; Dobson, 2002) were used to test for the main effect of 
condition by each comparing the full model with a null model without the predictor 
variable condition. Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), 95% confidence intervals of 





was computed to estimate effect sizes for main effects of condition. 
2.3. Results 
For anticipatory looking, we found a significant main effect of condition, F(2) = 3.42, p 
= .038, ƞ
2
 = 0.09, which is a medium effect size according to Cohen’s convention 
(1992). As predicted, planned comparisons revealed that children showed anticipatory 
looks significantly more towards tool A versus tool B in the CVC (MCVC = 0.2, SDCVC = 
0.57) than in the NVC (MNVC = – 0.06, SDNVC = 0.21), b = 0.26, SE = 0.11, t = 2.44, p = 
.018, CI [0.05, 0.47] (see Figure 1). 
For pupil diameter, we first examined whether the participants differed in pupil 
size across conditions during baseline measurement (Movie 2), before the different 
conditions were presented. We did not find any differences across conditions, F(2) = 
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1.19, p = .309 (see Figure 2). Thus, in all conditions the same prerequisites for the 
relative change of the pupil sizes were met (MNVC = 3.38, SDNVC = 0.43; MCVC = 3.23, 
SDCVC = 0.33; MMVC = 3.41, SDMVC = 0.54). Second, we found a significant main effect 
(with medium effect size) on relative change in pupil diameter (Movie 4 minus Movie 
2) depending on condition, F(2) = 3.32, p = .042, ƞ
2
 = 0.09. As predicted, planned 
comparisons revealed, that children in the MVC (MMVC = 0.16, SDMVC = 0.19)  
reacted with a significantly higher change in pupil diameter as compared to the  
CVC (MCVC = 0.04, SDCVC = 0.14), b = 0.12, SE = 0.05, t = 2.49, p = .015, CI [0.02, 
0.21]. Furthermore, we did not find any difference between CVC and NVC (MNVC = 
0.07, SDNVC = 0.16), b = – 0.03, SE = 0.05, t = – 0.68, p = .500, CI [– 0.01, 0.18.]  
(see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 1. Differences in anticipatory looking between tools A and B as a function of condition. Error bars 





Figure 2. Box-and-whisker plots of pupil diameter from the baseline measure (Movie 2) as a function of 
condition. 
 
Figure 3. Relative change in pupil diameter (Movie 4 minus Movie 2) as a function of condition. Error 





Our findings suggest that the distinction between situations that are considered 
prototypical moral and conventional violations begins much earlier in development than 
previously thought. Using anticipatory looking, we first found that 18-month-old 
children distinguished between two types of conventional situations, having descriptive 
expectations about an agent’s actions depending on prior information about the 
violation situations. More precisely, these situations consisted of two mutually 
exclusive game rules which were explained by the instructor, namely, that the observer 
should tear apart a picture with a certain tool, while not using the other tool (A or B 
depending on condition), which – later in context – leads to a no violation or a violation 
situation. As we predicted, in each conventional situation, the children exactly expected 
the observer to use the prescribed tool. This finding suggests that infants possess a third-
party descriptive understanding of conventional rule agreements. Second, in line with 
social domain theory (Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983, 2006), we were 
interested in whether infants were capable to differentiate between moral and 
conventional violation situations. Thus, we predicted a larger physiological arousal to 
the violation of a moral situation (destroying the property of the owner) than to the 
violation of a conventional situations (using the wrong tool), since moral violations are 
associated with emotional reactions that lead to an enhanced physiological arousal. As 
predicted, we found a larger relative increase in pupil dilation in response to a moral 
violation than to a conventional violation situation. Furthermore no difference was 
found between the other two conditions, in particular the conventional violation and no 
violation situation.  
However, there are further causes why pupil dilation interacts with physiological 
arousal (Eisenberg et al., 2014; Pletti et al., 2017). We controlled for cognitive or 
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sensory effort to exclude such alternative interpretations. First, we used the same video 
material across all conditions controlling for luminance. Second, we controlled for 
cognitive effort caused by speech comprehension by using the same sentence structure 
with the same number of syllables, speech volume and timing across all three 
conditions. Moreover in our view, the finding that infants had increased physiological 
arousal only in the moral violation suggests that we measured increased affective 
arousal (potentially based on empathic concern), and not alternative candidates, such as 
increased cognitive effort or attention. In the latter case, we would have expected a 
relative increase in pupil size in both the moral and conventional violation situation, 
since a norm violation also occurred in the conventional situation, and there is no a 
priori reason to assume that the moral situation is cognitively more complex or harder to 
process than the conventional violation situation. In fact, one may even construe the 
moral situation as simpler because everything is forbidden and no action should be 
performed at all. Importantly, if relative pupil size differences were driven by cognitive 
effort or the like, we should have found a pupil dilation difference between 
conventional violation and no violation, because it is cognitively more demanding to 
process an expected vs. unexpected action. However, the question arises, how this 
affective arousal in the moral violation condition should be interpreted. A large number 
of experimental studies have shown, that such affective arousal is associated with an 
empathic concern for the victim and leads to an altruistic motivation to show prosocial 
behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1990; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; 
Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2014; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Vaish et 
al., 2009). Moreover, our findings are consistent with psychological, physiological and 
philosophical explanations of morality (Killen & de Waal, 2000; Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Nichols, 2002; Smetana, 1984; Smetana et al., 2014; Tomasello, 2016; Turiel, 
1983, 2006). Violations of moral norms are considered more serious and punishable 
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than conventional violations, since they take the welfare of others into account. A 
plethora of studies have shown such interrelations between morality and other-regarding 
concerns (empathic concern, sympathy) in children and adults (Decety et al., 2012; 
Decety & Yoder, 2016; Eisenberg et al., 2014; Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2012; 
Jensen et al., 2014; Lamm et al., 2019; Nichols, 2002; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; 
Svetlova et al., 2010; Vaish et al., 2009).  
Taken together, our findings go beyond previous language-driven work in interview 
studies as well as behavioral studies, which suggest that children at the age of three 
reliably distinguish between non-arbitrary moral norms (e.g., against harming others) 
and more arbitrary conventional norms (e.g., Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012; 
Smetana et al., 2018; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). Our results are in line with recent 
findings,who suggest an early rudimentary norm understanding in the second year of 
life (Schmidt et al., 2019). We found that already 18-month-old children not only have 
distinguished (in a descriptive sense) between different types of conventional situations, 
but they were also more physiological aroused when witnessing a moral violation which 
is interpreted as affective arousal due to the severity of the moral violation (pressumably 
associated with empathic concern for the victim). Hence, both the capacity to feel 
sympathy and the ability for third-party descriptive expectations enable infants to 
differentiate between simple conventional and moral violations without having a full-
blown normative and agent-neutral understanding of norms yet. 
Further research is needed to disentangle the phenomenon of infants’ capacity to 
distinct moral and conventional situations. A combination of eye-tracking and 
behavioral task may be a suitable paradigm for studying the interaction between the 
children's first-personal behavior and the evaluation of third-parties in morally relevant 
situations. Investigating across these lines will contribute to a richer account of when 
and why children are able to distinct between morally relevant situations from others.  
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3. Study Set 2: The Moral Roots of Fairness: Young 
Children’s Enforcement of Fairness Norms Is Related to 
Their Prosocial Behavior 
3.1. Introduction 
Third-party norm enforcement is considered a key mechanism in the evolution of 
human cooperation (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004): we have 
normative expectations about how people “ought” to act in certain situations, for 
instance simple codes of conduct, such as dress codes or stronger prohibitions, such as 
not hitting, stealing or cheating each other. Thus, social norms – as learned behavioral 
standards – are shared and enforced among members of our cultural community, which 
ultimately leads to a peaceful group life and a large-scale cooperation. According to 
social domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 2008) social norms are subdivided into conventional 
and moral norms. While conventional norms are based on habits, agreements, traditions 
and customs (e.g., driving the car on the right side of the road), moral norms carry more 
normative weight and are based on a concern for the welfare of others (e.g., not pulling 
someone’s hair). When people are asked to distinguish moral issues from conventions, 
they commonly use the following criteria: both norms are generally permissible, but 
only moral norms should be adhered to under all circumstances (generalizability), they 
are valid even if an authority prescribes to violate the norm (authority contingency) and 
violations are considered more severe (seriousness) than disregarding conventions. For 
example, stealing is generally forbidden, even if a teacher allows the children to do so. 
In contrast, raising your hand to talk to the teacher (as regularity in the classroom) 
should only be valid at school, but not when you meet him on the street. 
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Empirical findings suggest, that 26-month-olds don’t, but 34-month-olds do, make 
the moral-conventional distinction, at least regarding to some of Turiel’s criteria 
(Smetana et al., 2012; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). Moreover, 2- and 3-year-olds protest 
simple conventional game violations, albeit the younger age group uses more 
imperative, not normative language (Rakoczy et al., 2008), and both age groups also 
learn to enforce norms especially in dyadic contexts (Hardecker & Tomasello, 2017). 
Behavioral studies also show that 3-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, protest against moral 
transgressions, such as violations of property rights, even if they are not affected 
(Rossano et al., 2011). The development of fairness as distributive justice (equality in 
resource allocation) has long been a topic of interest. Many empirical findings have 
shown that even infants have at minimum descriptive expectations about, and 
preferences for equality in resource allocation (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo et al., 
2016), and that third-party expectations of fairness are closely interrelated with infants’ 
own (first-party) morally relevant sharing behavior (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). In 
a recent study, Rakoczy and colleagues (Rakoczy et al., 2016) have found that 3- and 5-
year-olds protest against unfair resource allocation decisions in a paradigm closely 
linked to merit after having collaborated both when children are affected and when they 
are a disinterested observer. This suggests that by 3 years of age, children have some 
normative expectations and in particular about equality in resource allocation. 
Some researchers have pointed to different notions of justice (retributive and 
restorative justice) as responses to rule breaking in resource allocation tasks (Heffner & 
FeldmanHall, 2019; Riedl et al., 2015; Wenzel et al., 2008). Retributive justice refers to 
the repair of justice through punishment of the perpetrator, whereas restorative justice 
focuses more on collective solutions between the perpetrator and the victim, and thus 
repairs justice under a normative aspect through reaffirming a shared value-consensus 
among all affected group members. Interestingly, most developmental studies choose 
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costly punishment (as retributive justice) to investigate children’s reactions to unfair 
behavior (Kenward & Östh, 2012; Krasnow et al., 2016; McAuliffe et al., 2015; 
Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015). Such studies show that even preschool 
children use costly punishment and sacrifice their own resources to punish unfair 
behavior. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear whether children’s response to unfair behavior 
can be separated into restorative and retributive justice reactions and especially whether 
3-year-old children use restorative justice in the sense of a normative (shared value-
consensus) notion. 
Taken all findings together, it is not known so far whether children’s normative 
expectations about fairness are more moral (based on concern for the welfare of others) 
or more conventional (based on habits, rules, agreement, etc.), and what mechanisms 
underlie young children’s motivation to defend (third-party) fairness norms. A major 
question therefore pertains to the origins of our sense of fairness understood as a 
normative notion: is it mainly conventional, habitual (everyone typically gets his/her 
share) or is it interrelated with moral development, in particular with prosocial 
tendencies and other-regard, especially sympathy and altruism – that is, being interested 
in and concerned about others’ well-being and motivated to act accordingly (Batson & 
Shaw, 1991; Hepach et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2014; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011; Vaish et al., 2009). Furthermore, a second major question arises 
whether children are willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to repair justice in 
the sense of a restorative (normative) aspect (Riedl et al., 2015). 
We therefore investigated to what extent children’s sense of fairness is moral or 
conventional and with which prosocial motivations (empathic concern, altruism) it is 
interrelated. We hypothesis, that if an early concern for fairness as a normative concept 
is moral, children’s tendency to react against fairness violations should be correlated 
with their own prosocial behavior. If not, children’s behavior should be unrelated to 
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their first-party prosocial behavior. We predict that early normative expectations about 
third-party fairness are moral, because during development infants learn (1st-, 2nd-, and 
3rd-party) about, and experience, fair sharing and allocation, and are interested in 
others’ well-being. Thus, we also suggest – following social domain theory (Killen & 
Smetana, 2015; Smetana et al., 2012; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983, 2008) – 
that children’s moral concern for fairness cannot be easily changed by authorities 
legitimizing unfairness (authority-independency). That is, children who have a moral 
concern for third-party fairness won’t react against someone who does not follow an 
authority’s order to be unfair (i.e., to allocate resources unequally). Children, however, 
who have not yet developed a moral concern for third-party fairness, will protest if a 
distributor does not follow the authority’s dictate to be unfair. Furthermore, the 
relationship between one's own prosocial tendencies and third-party punishment for 
restoring justice should also be linked when children sacrifice their own resources to 
restore fairness as a norm. 
Thus, we conducted three experiments to investigate whether children show distinct 
prosocial motivations (empathic concern, altruism) in different fairness contexts. In 
Experiment 1, we investigated whether three-year-old children protest against unequal 
distributions without giving them any indication to act fairly. In Experiment 2, we were 
interested in whether 3-year-old children have a moral understanding of fairness that is 
authority-independent. Finally, Experiment 3 examined whether children punish unfair 




3.2. Experiment 1 
3.2.1. Method 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-eight 3-year-old children (M = 38 months; 34 – 45 months; 16 girls) 
participated in the study. Children were native German speakers, came from mixed 
socio-economic backgrounds from a large German city and were recruited via urban 
daycare centers (in which testing took place). Parents provided written informed 
consent. Six additional children were tested, but excluded from the final sample due to 
experimenter error (3), language and comprehension difficulties (1), and 
uncooperativeness (2). 
3.2.1.2. Design 
In a within-participant-design, children received a short warm-up session, followed by a 
third party fairness task and two prosocial tasks. The two prosocial tasks were presented 
either before or after the fairness tasks. Additionally, the order of the two prosocial 
tasks was systematically varied. Finally, the children performed a vocabulary test at the 
end of the session. 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
Two experimenters conducted the study, which lasted roughly 20 minutes. At the start 
of the session, the first experimenter (E1) introduced two hand puppets (owl and bear), 
that were animated by the second experimenter (E2). The child, E1, and E2 sat at a 




Third-party Fairness Task 
The third-party fairness task was based on a previous study (Rakoczy et al., 2016). E1 
played the role of the coordinator of the situation, brought out four resources (different 
fruit types: strawberry, apple, orange, and pear, in counterbalanced trial order) and 
instructed the distributor puppet to allocate the items between himself and the recipient 
puppet (owl and bear in both roles in counterbalanced order). The child as unaffected 
bystander witnessed the allocation between the two hungry puppets, which consisted of 
four distribution trials: one baseline trial with equal distribution (2:2) and three test 
trials with unequal distribution (3:1). Neither E1 nor both puppets used any fairness 
words (e.g., distribute, allocate, fair, divide etc.) or any emotional cues to find out, if the 
child already held a normative fairness concept and to avoid any influence to the child’s 
protest behavior in a direction to act fair. E1 announced that he had important 
paperwork to do, and turned away. According to an agreement between the two 
puppets, the recipient asked the distributor to take care of the fruits and went into his 
bed to sleep, which stood beside the distribution situation on the table. The other puppet 
began to distribute the four items slowly, always started with the recipients’ plate. When 
he finished the distribution, he looked at the two plates for 5 s. After this short pause, he 
moved the two plates closer to the child and asked: “Like this?” Hence, the child had 
the opportunity to protest or correct against the outcome of the resource allocation. The 
situation always ended up in the same way: the recipient woke up and regarded the 
distribution; E1 turned back and cleared up the items. 
Emotional Sharing Task 
The emotional sharing task was based on a former prosocial situation task (Vaish et al., 
2009) and was adapted in the following way. E2 and the child sat on the table, E2 to the 
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left of the child. E1 came to the table with three mice in the hand and said, “Look what I 
found, mice!” Then at the same time she handed two mice to the child and one mouse to 
E2. Directly after that, E1 placed a box on the table in front of E2 and disappeared out 
of the focus of the child. E2 played happily with her mouse and the box, without 
engaging with the child. About 10 s later, E2 accidentally lost her mouse through a hole 
in the box, pointed to the hole, and spoke in a sad tone, “Oh no, my mouse!” She then 
tried to grasp it out of the hole. Once her effort remained unsuccessful, she leant over 
the box and sighed. From this moment on, she was vocally and facially obviously sad. 
E2 looked slightly at the direction of the child, but never focused directly the face, 
child’s hands or its mice to prevent giving her hints or pressuring her to help. During the 
next 2 min (from the moment E2 leant over the box and sighed), children’s behavior 
was coded (see below). After the 2 min, E2 opened her box, got her mouse back, and 
was again obviously happy. The prosocial situation did not last the full 2 min (a) if 
children became very upset, in which case the study was cut short and E2 opened the 
box to get back her mouse, or (b) if children handed one or both of their mice to E2, in 
which case E2 gratefully took and then handed back mouse/mice before opened the box 
and got back her own mouse. 
Costly Sharing Task 
The costly sharing task was adapted from a previous sharing task (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011). E2 waited silently at the back. E1 sat vis-à-vis to the child at the 
table. E1 placed two toys (Lego brick, stuffed cat, both same sizes) on a wooden tray 
100 cm apart (position counterbalanced) and asked the child to pick one of the two toys 
(labeled as preferred toy). Directly after the decision, E1 gave the second toy (non-
preferred) to the child and disappeared with the tray in the back. After that E2 came 
back, sat in front of the infant, looked directly at the child’s face and asked her for a toy 
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in an alternating manner between ‘‘can I have one?’’ and ‘‘can I have one, please?’’ 
every five seconds for up to 25 seconds.  
Spontaneous Intervention 
During a short warm-up phase, E1, the distributor puppet, and the child played first with 
a ball and then with two instrumental tasks (hammer task, disk-and-peg task) in order to 
familiarize the child with the puppet. In the instrumental tasks, children had the 
opportunity to intervene spontaneously and correct the protagonist who made a mistake 
with conventional toys (trying but failing to push a ball into cuboid with his nose; 
putting a disk vertically onto a peg, which would not fit). 
Verbal Intelligence 
For measuring verbal intelligence level, children were administered the vocabulary 
subtest of the Kaufmann Assessment Battery for Children - Second Edition (KABC-II, 
Kaufmann, 2015) for children and adolescents aged 3 to 18 years. Children had to name 
the objects on a series of pictures shown to them. 
3.2.1.4.  Coding and Reliability 
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single observer. 
A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses and conditions of the study, 
transcribed and coded a random sample of 25% of all sessions for reliability, expect for 
verbal intelligence score. 
Protest 
Children’s spontaneous behavioral interventions and verbal utterances were transcribed 
and given one of the following codes. A given response was coded as “protest” if the 
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child clearly intervened by using normative vocabulary (e.g., “No! This is not fair!”; 
“You have to do it differently!”; “This is not right!”), if the child expressed an 
imperative to the distributor without using normative vocabulary (“No, he needs one 
more!”; “Look, there is one missing here!”), if the child corrected the distribution to 
equal or to unequal to the disadvantage of the distributor and if the intervention was 
clearly addressed to the distributor puppet, or if the child pointed to the fruits or plates. 
All other indifferent reactions were coded as “none”. Overall, each child received a 
summed score consisted of each protest behavior over the three test trials (0 - 3) and 
over the baseline trial (0 - 1). Interrater reliability was good, Cohen’s κ = .80. 
Emotional Sharing 
Codes were used in hierarchical categories, with their associated scores in parentheses. 
A given response was coded as “helps/shares (3)” if the child fully approached E2 and 
clearly offered her one or both mice, put the mouse near E2, made help suggestions 
(e.g., “I help you to get the mouse out of the box”) or by indirect helping directed to E1 
in an effort to draw E1’s attention to the situation. A given response was coded as 
“describes situation (2)” if the child described the situation verbally (e.g., “The mouse is 
lost/in the box”) or with gestures (e.g. pointing to box), if the child points out that he 
had a mouse or with gestural communication (e.g., pointing to own mouse), while 
looking not to E1 but to situation or E2. A given response was coded as “attends to the 
situation (1)” if the child watched E2 and the situation in a serious way, stopped play, 
went to E1 or moved away but continued watching E2. A given response was coded as 
“ignore situation (0)”, if the child showed no involvement or interest in the situation. In 
a different way from Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009), since no child showed 
distress, this category was not included in analyses. Although children could show any 
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or all of these prosocial behaviors, for analyses, children’s prosocial score consisted of 
each child’s highest score. Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = 1. 
Costly Sharing 
Codes were used in hierarchical categories with their associated scores in parentheses. If 
the child shared both toys with E1, then the response was coded as “both (3)”. If the 
child shared the preferred toy with E1, then it was coded as “pref (2)”. The sharing of 
the unpreferred toy was coded as “unpref (1)”, whereas the code “none (0)” was given if 
the child shared nothing. Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = 1. 
Spontaneous Intervention 
We controlled for children’s overall tendency to react spontaneously in social 
interactions and its possible influence on the protest behavior in the fairness tasks, by 
measuring children’s behavior during the warm up tasks. A sum score over the two 
warm up tasks was calculated, by counting how often the children reacted 
spontaneously (0-2). Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = .91. 
Verbal Intelligence 
We calculated the standard deviation (SD = 15) from the mean (M = 100), to determine 
the verbal intelligence level. In the lower age range of the test (6 years and younger), 
the reliability measures for the subtests are calculated between .70 and .97. The internal 
consistency of the K-ABC-II core subtests also shows sufficient reliability. 
3.2.1.5. Statistical Analysis 
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.6.1. (R Core Team, 2019). We used a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) to compare the protest measures between 
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the one baseline trial (equal distribution) and the three test trials (unequal distribution). 
Since the protest measure violated assumptions of standard linear models (i.e., normally 
distributed errors), we used a GLM with poisson error structure for the protest measure 
over the three test trials. The full model included the two predictor variables emotional 
sharing and costly sharing (both z-transformed), three control variables gender, verbal 
intelligence, and spontaneous intervention (all z-transformed, except gender), and an 
offset term (log-transformed total valid number of test trials per child) to adjust for the 
number of opportunities children had to perform protest (i.e., response variables were 
treated as rates). Effects of interest and planned comparisons were tested using 
likelihood ratio tests (LRT; Dobson, 2002) by each comparing the fit of the full model 
with a fit of a reduced model without the predictor variables. Preliminary analyses 
found no effects of gender, verbal intelligence, and spontaneous intervention. 
Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), standard errors (SE), 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs) and odds ratios (ORs) were obtained from the full model. For non-parametric 
tests, we computed the effect size r (Rosenthal, 1994). 
3.2.2. Results 
As predicted, children protested significantly more in the unequal (test) trials than in the 
equal (baseline) trial, IMunequal = 1.33, IMequal = 0, z = – 3.62, p = .000, r = – 0.68, which 
is a large effect size according to Cohen’s convention (1992). More precisely, none of 
the children ever protested in the baseline trial. Thus, we built a subset including the 
protest measures as dependent variable over the three test trials. For protest behavior, 
there was a significant main effect of emotional sharing, χ
2
(1) =  4.76, p = .029,  
b = 0.50, SE = 0.25, CI [0.01, 0.97], OR = 1.64. However, no main effect of costly 
sharing was found, χ
2
(1) = 0.82, p = .365, b = 0.15, SE = 0.16, CI [– 0.17, 0.47], OR = 




Figure 4. Experiment 1 revealed that emotional sharing, but not costly sharing, had a significant effect on 
children’s protest behavior against unequal distributions. Results are represented using estimates (beta 
coefficients) and their CIs from GLM (poisson), * p < .05. 
3.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we were interested in whether 3-year-old children understand fairness 
as a normative notion. Our results revealed that although not giving them any fairness 
cues, children, who observed a third-party distribution between two hand puppets, 
protested and intervened against unequal distributions, but interestingly none of the 
children ever protested against equal distributions. Moreover, we also asked which 
motivational factors (empathic concern, altruism) are associated with children’s 
responses against unequal distributions. Results show, that emotional sharing, but not 
costly sharing is related to children’s verbal and behavioral utterances, indicating that 
compassionate children are more willing to react against unfair allocations. Our results 
thus are in line with previous findings (Hepach, 2017; Jensen et al., 2014; Rakoczy et 
al., 2016; Vaish et al., 2009), and provide evidence that other-regarding concerns such 
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as sympathy are key motivations of children’s normative fairness expectations. In sum, 
since we used Experiment 1 as a baseline measure, we investigated the normative 
notion of children’s fairness expectations more systematically in Experiment 2. We 
were therefore interested whether children’s normative expectations of fairness are 
simply based on conventions such as simple regularities and habits or whether children 
have a deeper moral understanding of fairness, which take the welfare of others into 
account. In this context, we use Turiels criteria “authority independency”. Assuming 
that 3-year-olds already have a normative understanding of fairness, we expected that 
children would protest and intervene against unequal distributions despite the 
authority’s demand to act unequally. Secondly, we expected that children's reactions to 
unequal distributions would be related to empathic concern (for the victim) and not to 
general altruistic tendencies. 
3.3. Experiment 2 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-eight 3-year-old children (M = 41 months; 36 – 47 months; 14 girls) 
participated in the study and were recruited and tested as in Experiment 1. Three 
additional children were tested, but excluded from the final sample due to 
uncooperativeness (3). 
3.3.1.2. Design 
The number and order of tasks in a within-participants-design (warm-up session, 





Third-Party Fairness Task 
The general procedure was almost the same as in Experiment 1(e.g., roles and seating 
arrangements of E1, E2 and hand puppets; 4 different fruit types; 4 distribution trials). 
In addition to Experiment 1, we were interested, if children continue to protest even 
when an authority prompts the puppets to follow an unequal distribution. Thus, E1 no 
longer played the role of a neutral coordinator, but rather established a dictate in its role 
as authority to distribute resources unequally. Hence, in the first sub-phase, E1 brought 
out four fruits and stipulated the distributor puppet to allocate the items unequally 
between him and the recipient puppet to distributor’s advantage. Afterwards he turned 
away. In response, both puppets were surprised by the authority’s demand to act 
unequal. Supplementary, the recipient puppet was obviously sad. Like in Experiment 1, 
the recipient asked the distributor to allocate the four resources before he went to bed. 
The second sub-phase consisted of four distribution test trials, two trial with equal 
distribution (2:2) and two trials with unequal distribution (3:1). Thus, the child as 
unaffected bystander had the opportunity to intervene and/or protest, directly to the 
authority in the sub-phase 1, and/or, against the distributor puppet in the sub-phase 2, 
who followed or violated the rule of inequality. The situation ended up in the same way 
as in Experiment 1. 
Emotional Sharing task 
The general procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. At 
the beginning, E2 brought out his favorite toy (a stuffed bear) and explained that his toy 
always comforts him, when he is sad. Afterwards he cuddled the bear and placed it 
between himself and the child. Then E1 came back and handed one mouse to E2 and 
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one mouse to the child. The procedure than followed the same way as in Experiment 1, 
where E2 lost his mouse in the box and the reactions of the child were coded. Thus, the 
child had the opportunity to act prosocial by helping to get the mouse of the box, 
comforting with the teddy, or sharing his own mouse with E2. 
Costly Sharing Task 
The general procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with following transformations. 
First, we replaced the stuffed cat with a same sized plastic figure, to get the same 
texture as the Lego brick. Second, E2 asked for the toys with the words, “Oh, can I have 
that?”, and “Can I have that, please?”  
Control Measures 
As in Experiment 1, spontaneous interventions were conducted during the warm up 
session. Verbal intelligence level was assessed with the Kaufmann Assessment Battery 
for Children - Second Edition (KABC-II) (Kaufmann, 2015). 
3.3.1.4. Coding 
Coding was the same as in Experiment 1. Interrater reliability was very good (Cohen’s κ 
= .88, protest; κ = 1, emotional sharing; κ = 1, costly sharing; κ = .83, spontaneous 
intervention). 
3.3.1.5. Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were carried out as in Experiment 1. To account for non-independence of 
observations due to our within-participants design (each child participated in each 
condition), we used generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) with binomial error 
structure that allow for the inclusion of both fixed and random effects (Baayen et al., 
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2008; Bates et al., 2014). The full model included the predictor variables distribution 
(equal vs. unequal), emotional sharing and costly sharing (both z-transformed), the 
interaction of emotional sharing x distribution, the interaction of costly sharing x 
distribution, the three control variables gender, verbal intelligence, and spontaneous 
intervention (all z-transformed, except gender) as fixed effects and participant ID as a 
random effect. First, the combined significance of the predictor variables was tested by 
comparing the fit of the full model (including the interaction effects, predictor variables 
and control variables) with the fit of a null model that only contained the control 
variables using LRTs. The approach of testing the overall full model against a null 
model helps to protect against Type I error inflation arising from models comprising 
more than one predictor variable (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). This full-null model 
comparison was significant, χ
2
(5) = 31.42, p < .001. Next, effects of interest and 
planned comparisons were tested using likelihood ratio tests (LRT; Dobson, 2002) by 
each comparing the fit of the full model with a fit of a reduced model without the 
predictor variables. Preliminary analyses found no effects of gender, verbal intelligence, 
and spontaneous intervention. In order to test for the main effect of emotional sharing 
and costly sharing on direct protest against the authority, we used LRT in a GLM with 
poisson error structure. Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), standard errors (SE), 
95% confidence intervals (CIs), and odds ratios (ORs) were obtained from the full 
models.  
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Overall Protest 
Overall, children protested significantly more in the unequal distribution condition than 
in the equal distribution condition, χ
2
(1) = 18.96, p < .001, b = 2.80, SE = 0.91,  
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CI [1.30, 5.16], OR = 16.49 (see Figure 5). Moreover, we found a significant interaction 
effect of distribution and emotional sharing χ
2
(1) = 10.70, p =.001, b = 2.51, SE = 0.93, 
CI [0.92, 4.81], OR = 12.27 (see Figure 5), suggesting that the higher children scored in 
emotional sharing, the more they tended to protest in the unequal distribution condition 
as compared with the equal distribution condition (see Figure 6, for an overview of the 
protest behavior of the four different emotional sharing groups). Furthermore, no 
significant interaction effect between costly sharing and distribution was found, χ
2
(1) = 
0.87, p =.35, b = – 0.69, SE = 0.76, CI [– 2.31, 0.76], OR = 0.50 (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2 indicated that the children protested significantly more against the unequal versus 
equal distribution. Moreover, despite an authority’s command to act unequally, emotional but not costly 
sharing had a significant effect on children’s protest behavior against unequal distributions. Results are 





Figure 6. Mean sum score of protest for the four different emotional sharing groups (0 = ignore; 1 = 
attend; 2 = describe; 3 = help/share/comfort) and the distribution condition (equal versus unequal 
distribution). 
3.3.2.2. Protest Directed at Authority 
In order to test if emotional sharing or costly sharing is related to the protest measure 
directed at the authority, we ran further analysis. Once again, emotional sharing had a 
significant effect on protest behavior against the authority, χ
2
(1) =  4.93, p = .036, b = 
0.59, SE = 0.28, CI [0.04, 1.14], OR = 1.80. Again, there was no main effect of costly 
sharing, χ
2
(1) = 0.52, p = .470, b = – 0.17, SE = 0.23, CI [– 0.62, 0.29], OR = 0.85. 
3.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we were interested whether children’s normative expectations about 
fairness have a moral dimension by using Turiels authority-independency criteria 
(Turiel, 1983, 2008). Results indicating, that despite the authorities demands to act 
unequally, children protested and corrected against the norm follower who acted 
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unequally, but not against the norm violator who acted equally. In addition, we have 
also examined the direct protest against authority and found that children also showed 
protest in this context, which is a strong reaction because it might cost a lot of effort for 
the children, especially when it is necessary to protest against an adult (experimenter) 
whom they do not know. In sum, these findings give further evidence that 3-year-old 
children regarded fairness as a moral component rather than a simple behavioral 
regularity. Moreover, we replicated our findings from Experiment 1 and found that 
children’s prosocial motivation in response to an unfair offers was associated with 
emotional sharing, but not with costly sharing. In Experiment 3, we were particularly 
interested in the extent to which children act against inequality by measuring the costly 
punishment behavior of children as restorative justice. In other words, if children are 
willing to sacrifice their own resources, they would restore justice between the victim 
and the perpetrator. In addition, we have suggested that altruistic tendencies measured 
by children’s first-party costly sharing behavior (and not the emotional sharing, 
empathic concern) should be related to the third-party costly punishment behavior. 
3.4. Experiment 3 
3.4.1. Method 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-eight 3-year-olds (M = 44 months; 36 – 49 months; 14 girls) participated in the 
study and were recruited and tested as in Experiment 1 and 2. Three additional children 
were tested, but excluded from the final sample due to difficulties in language 





The number and order of tasks in a within-participants-design (warm-up session, 
fairness task, and prosocial tasks) was identical to Experiment 1 and 2. 
3.4.1.3. Procedure 
Third-Party Fairness Task 
The general procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. As 
in Experiment 1, E1 played the role of coordinator in the situation. In the introduction 
phase, he took out five stickers and explained that these now belong to the child. Then 
E1 placed the stickers in a box and put the box right beside the child. Afterwards, he 
brought out six fruits and instructed the distributor puppet to allocate the items between 
himself and the recipient puppet. As in Experiment 1, the distributor allocated the fruits 
in four trials, one baseline equal distribution trial (3:3) and three unequal distribution 
tests trials (5:1). In contrast to the test trial in Experiment 1, the distributor intended to 
act unfairly.  
Immediately after the distribution, E1 turned back. In the baseline trial, E1 asked 
the child, "Well, look, the bear has exactly as many fruits as the owl. Both have the 
same number. Is that good or bad?” In the test trial, E1 described, "Well, look, the bear 
has more fruits than the owl. Is that good or bad?” In this context, it is important to 
mention that only the “bad” answers of the child in the test phase led to the opportunity 
to utilize own stickers to punish the unfair distributor by redistribute the same number 
of fruits from the distributor to the recipient. Thus, E1 opened the box and asked the 
child to give away up to five stickers. Here, the child had the chance to decide by 
putting as many stickers as it liked in the lid of the box. Along these lines, E1 removed 
the same number of fruits from the distributor to hand them to the recipient. At the end 
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of each trial, E1 took out another wooden box and told "Then we put your remaining 
stickers here in your treasure chest." 
Emotional Sharing task 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2. 
Costly Sharing Task 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2. 
Control Measures 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, spontaneous interventions were conducted during the warm 
up session. Verbal intelligence level was assessed with the Kaufmann Assessment 
Battery for Children - Second Edition (KABC-II) (Kaufmann, 2015). 
3.4.1.4. Coding 
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded like in Experiment 1 and 2. In the 
third-party fairness task, we counted the number of stickers the child was willing to give 
away to punish the distributor. Furthermore, we coded the answer of the children to the 
explicit question, if the distributor acted good or bad. Interrater reliability was very 
good (κ = 1, stickers; κ = 1, explicit question). For the prosocial tasks as well as the 
spontaneous intervention, coding was the same as in Experiment 1 and 2. Interrater 
reliability was good to very good (κ = 0.78, emotional sharing; κ = 1, costly sharing; κ = 




3.4.1.5. Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were carried out as in Experiment 1 and 2. First, we were interested in 
whether the proportion of children who answered both explicit questions correctly 
deviated significantly from chance (50%). Thus, we conducted an exact binomial test 
and a planned exact one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test. For costly punishment, we 
used GLMMs with poisson error structure. The full model included as fixed effects the 
predictor variables emotional sharing and costly sharing (both z-transformed), three 
control variables gender, verbal intelligence, and spontaneous intervention (all z-
transformed, except gender), trial (z-transformed) as random slope and subject ID as 
random intercept. Effects of interest and planned comparisons were tested using 
likelihood ratio tests (LRT; Dobson, 2002) by each comparing the fit of the full model 
with a fit of a reduced model without the predictor variables. Preliminary analyses 
found no effects of gender and spontaneous intervention. Unstandardized parameter 
estimates (b), standard errors (SE), 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and odds ratios 
(ORs) were obtained from the full models. For non-parametric tests, we computed the 
effect size r (Rosenthal, 1994).  
3.4.2. Results 
3.4.2.1. Explicit Question 
An exact binomial test indicated that the proportion of children of .96, CI [0.84, 1], who 
correctly answered “good” in the equal distribution trial was significantly higher than 
the expected chance level .50, p < .001 (one-sided). Moreover, a planned exact one-
sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed, that the proportion of children (.83), who 
correctly answered “bad” in the unequal distribution trial was not higher than chance 
level .50, V = 239, p = .193 (one-sided). In order to examine the latter result, we 
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subdivided children’s responding to the explicit questions in three groups: a correct 
answers group (all unequal distribution trials were judged as bad), a mixed answers 
group (not all unequal trials were judged as bad), and an incorrect answers group (all 
unequal trials were judged as good) and ran further control measures (see below). 
3.4.2.2. Costly Punishment 
Unlike in Experiment 1 und 2, we found a significant main effect of costly sharing on 
children’s third-party costly punishment behavior, χ
2
(1) = 4.43, p =.035, b = 0.57, SE = 
0.24, CI [0.09, 1.05], OR = 1.77, and did not find a significant main effect of emotional 
sharing, χ
2
(1) = 0.13, p = .718, b = – 0.09, SE = 0.26, CI [– 0.61, 0.42], OR = 0.91 
(Figure 7). Furthermore, we found a significant main effect of the vocabulary test,  
χ
2
(1) = 5.99, p = .014, b = – 0.73, SE = 0.21, CI [– 1.13, – 0.32], OR = 0.48, which 
indicated that children, who higher scored in the vocabulary test, are less willing to 
costly punish. We therefore ran further control analysis to exclude the influence of 




Figure 7. Experiment 3 showed that children’s third party costly punishment behavior of an unfair 
distributor is associated with children’s first party costly sharing behavior. Results are represented using 
estimates (beta coefficients) and its CIs from GLMM (poisson), *p <.05. 
3.4.2.3. Control Analysis 
Our first control question was whether the three different groups (correct, mixed, 
incorrect responding to the explicit question) differed in their language competence. We 
therefore used a GLM with gaussian error structure with the predictor group and tested 
the main effect group on the dependent variable vocabulary test using LRT. Results 
revealed no significant main effect on group, F(1) = 1.15, p = .294. These findings 
indicate that the three groups did not differ in their language comprehension skills 
(Mcorrect = 96.54, SDcorrect = 13.45; Mmixed = 100.83, SDmixed = 16.93; Mincorrect = 102.11, 
SDincorrect = 6.412). Second, for children’s costly punishment behavior, we used a GLM 
with gaussian error structure with the predictor group and found a significant main 
effect, F(1) = 7.83, p = .010. The Bonferroni post hoc t-tests revealed, that at least the 
correct responding group (M = 0.35, SD = 0.34) differed significantly from the incorrect 
responding group (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00, t(12) = – 3.75, p = .027). The other 
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comparisons to the mixed responding group (M = 0.28, SD = 0.37) did not yield any 
significant results. Third, we were interested whether the competent children in the 
explicit question group also acted more altruistically. Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
indicated a significant main effect of group, H(2) = 10.86, p = .004. The Bonferroni post 
hoc tests (Dunn's-test) revealed that the children from the correct answer group (Mdn = 
19.50) significantly differs from the mixed answer group (Mdn = 10.67, p = .050) and 
from the incorrect answer group (Mdn = 9.83, p = .008). Overall, the results suggest that 
(i) the responding to the explicit question is not dependent on language skills, and (ii) 
that the three different groups reflect individual differences of children’s fairness 
expectations and costly sharing behavior. 
3.4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we investigated whether children are willing to sacrifice their own 
resources to punish the perpetrator and restore justice between the victim and the 
perpetrator. Our results indicated that children indeed responded in line with our 
considerations. Interestingly, in that costly restorative justice situation, children’s 
motivations is positively related with their own costly sharing behavior, which can be 
interpreted as general altruistic tendencies (cf. Jensen et al., 2014; Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011). Moreover, competent children, who answered all questions 
correctly (judging equal distributions as good and unequal distributions as bad) are also 
those who showed more punitive behavior and were more altruistic than the 
incompetent children (answering all questions wrong). However, this does not seem to 




3.5. General Discussion 
Our results provide clear evidence that 3-year-old children have a moral concept of 
fairness in terms of distributive justice. Three experiments revealed that children 
enforce third-party fairness norms as unaffected bystanders, even without giving them 
indications of acting fairly (Experiment 1: normative understanding of fairness), that 
they protest and intervene against injustice even when an authority dictates inequality 
(Experiment 2: moral norm understanding: authority-independency), and finally that 
they are even willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to punish unfair behavior 
in the sense of restorative justice (Experiment 3: costly punishment). Moreover, 
children's normative expectations of fairness are closely linked to their own prosocial 
behavior, particularly to the concern for the welfare of others (Experiment 1 & 2: 
sympathy, empathic concern) and to an altruistic interest in punishing norm violators 
(Experiment 3). 
Thus, our results go beyond prior research on children’s norm understanding about 
fairness in many ways. Previous findings suggested that preschool children have 
descriptive expectations about equal resource allocation (Geraci & Surian, 2011; 
Meristo et al., 2016; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). A recent study also provided 
evidence about fairness as normative expectations in 3-year-old children, but these 
results were linked with joined merit outcomes (Rakoczy et al., 2016). Moreover, from 
a moral-motivational perspective (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; 
Turiel, 1983, 2008), 3-year-old children are capable to distinct between conventions and 
moral issues at least to some of Turiels criteria. And 3-year old children protest and 
react against a norm violator in conventional as well as moral contexts as unaffected 
observers (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Rossano et al., 2011; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; 
Vaish et al., 2011). We replicated earlier findings (Rakoczy et al., 2016) and gave 
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additional evidence (Experiment 1) by showing that children protest even without 
giving them any other influences or indications to act fair. Experiment 2 showed that 
children's expectations of fairness not only have a conventional dimension, e.g. as a 
simple behavioral standard, but also a moral dimension in many respects. First, the 
children protested against a norm follower who adhered to a prescribed rule. Secondly, 
the children protested directly against an authority who had established the rule. 
Thirdly, the children did not protest against a norm violator, who equally shared. If 
there was only an interest in maintaining fairness as a conventional rule, the protest 
pattern should have been oppositely by showing that children simple protest a norm 
violator irrespectively what rule is followed. Thus, our findings are in line with social 
domain theory (Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983, 2008), which claims that adults 
and children explicitly judge moral from conventional transgressions along various 
criteria, in particular concerning authority-independency. Moreover, a plethora of 
studies showed that 3-year-old children are generally capable to intervene and protest 
against norm violations, for instance against conventional game rule violations 
(Rakoczy et al., 2008) as well as against moral transgressions (Rossano et al., 2011; 
Vaish et al., 2011). Furthermore, Experiment 3 indicated the strength of moral norm 
understanding, by investigating how far the children would go to punish unfair behavior 
and to restore fairness. The results showed that the 3-year-olds were willing to sacrifice 
their own resources to punish and restore unfair behavior. These results are consistent 
with previous findings showing third-party costly punishment behavior in preschoolers 
against moral violations (Kenward & Östh, 2012; Krasnow et al., 2016; McAuliffe et 
al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011). This is a new aspect, as our findings are in line 
with considerations on restorative justice, which focus more on the collectivist aspect of 
fairness. In these considerations, repairing fairness is used as a normative term that 
involves all affected parties (perpetrator and victim), not simply punishing the 
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perpetrator (Heffner & FeldmanHall, 2019; Riedl et al., 2015; Wenzel et al., 2008). We 
created a paradigm that not only offered the possibility of simply punishing the 
perpetrator, but also of restoring justice for the victim by giving the opportunity to 
transfer resources, not just taking them away. Here we showed that competent children, 
which were better in answering the explicit question correctly, acted also more 
altruistically and were those with stronger punishment and restorative justice 
tendencies. However, results from Experiment 3 are ambiguous and give rise to further 
investigations. The motivation which underlies the behavior of those children who 
ansered the explicit question (whether the unfair distribution is bad) in a mixed fashion 
is still unclear. It might be possible, that they played strategically due to egotistic 
motives, but posses normative fairness considerations, and simple were not willing to 
sacrifice own resources to repair equal treatment. It would be interesting to investigate 
what their motivations are related to. Furthermore, we also conducted a mixed paradigm 
with retributive as well as restorative justice considerations. It might be interesting to 
examine children’s behavior only in a restorative justice situation. Furthermore, more 
research is needed to disentangle the phenomena of children’s early sense of fairness. 
An interesting question for future research might be, when exactly infants’ develop 
genuine normative expectations about fairness. A suitable paradigm using eye-tracking 
may show that children younger than 3 years of age are capable to differentiate between 
moral and conventional norms. One could for example investigate the potential 
influence of intelligence, executive functions, inhibition or theory of mind capacities on 
prosocial behavior and fairness. Finally, our results give evidence about a spesific moral 
norm, such as fairness. However, our results do not answer aspects to other types of 
social norms, for instance harm-related moral issues. 
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Overall, our findings may help to better understand to what extent the ontogeny of 
fairness norms can be characterized as moral and in how far it is associated with 
children’s developing concern for the welfare of others in different contexts.  
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4. Study 3: Decategorization Leads Preschoolers to Treat In-
Group and Out-Group Members Equally 
4.1. Introduction 
Humans are socio-cultural beings who depend on one another and who have a natural 
tendency to collaborate, cooperate, and to form groups with others, which are typically 
characterized by a common set of values, norms, and practices (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Schmidt et al., 2019; Tomasello, 
2016). The motivational and normative forces behind that mutual altruism and 
cooperation are grounded evolutionarily, since a relatively small, interdependent 
community offers the most effective loyalty, trust and cooperation (Brewer & Caporael, 
2006; Fiske, 2000; Tomasello, 2016). According to these considerations, if one is part 
of a cohesive group, the chances of exploitation are relatively low. In the end, the entire 
group, strengthened by mutual support and cooperation among community members, 
has the greatest chance of survival compared to other individuals. Moreover, the 
identification with the preferred (in-)group is at the same time coupled with a social 
comparison with other (out-)groups, to which one automatically does not belong. This 
typically leads to social categorization and inter-group distinction, accompanied by 
positive emotional attachment and consensus among members of the same group 
(Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Group identification and categorization may lead to intergroup-bias, that is a 
systematic tendency, to evaluate the in-group more favourably than the opposing out-
group (Hewstone et al., 2002). As the salience of category membership increases, not 
only in-group members are perceived as more similar to each other and thus become 
part of one’s own self-concept, but out-group members are also be seen as a 
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homogeneous whole, which ultimately leads to depersonalization and dehumanization 
(Brewer, 1996, 1999; Haslam, 2004; Tajfel, 1969; Turner et al., 1994). Intergroup-bias 
takes place under various circumstances, even without social interaction, in anonymous 
situations, and in the absence of conflicts and competition (Abrams, 2010; Crisp & 
Turner, 2009; Mullen et al., 1992). However, there is much disagreement whether 
intergroup-bias leads exclusively to in-group favouritism or whether it goes along with 
active forms of out-group derogation. In the first case (in-group favouritism) the out-
group is simply ignored as a by-product (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Park & 
Judd, 2005; Tajfel, 1969). Whereas the latter case (out-group derogation) includes 
intentional aggressive behaviour and negative emotions toward the other group, such as 
discrimination, prejudice and stereotyping (Hewstone et al., 2002; Miglietta et al., 2014; 
Park & Judd, 2005; Sumner, 1906). A plethora of developmental investigations focuses 
on social categorization processes. Such studies show that intergroup-bias robustly takes 
place in the late preschool years in minimal group settings (Dunham et al., 2011), 
manifests in various prosocial forms like sharing or helping behavior (Benozio & 
Diesendruck, 2015; Fehr et al., 2008; Over, 2018; Sierksma et al., 2018) or in trust and 
loyalty (Misch et al., 2016; Rutland et al., 2015). Recent studies even pointed to an 
interplay between morality and group identity (Chalik & Dunham, 2018; Rutland et al., 
2010). 
In today’s times of more and more heterogeneous societies and attempts to 
overcome prejudice and xenophobia, it is important to examine not only intergroup-
bias, but also ways to overcome group thinking and foster equal treatment of individuals 
regardless of group membership. Over the years a variety of individual and intergroup 
approaches have been developed to reduce intergroup-bias (for an overview see: 
Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014; Hewstone et al., 2002; Paluck & Green, 2009). The 
most frequently investigated method in developmental research is the extended contact 
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approach, in which intergroup contact occurred indirectly through other in-group 
members (e.g., Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza, Giovannini, & Wölfer, 2014; Vezzali, 
Stathi, Giovannini, Capozza, & Visintin, 2015). These interventions promote cross-
group friendships between school children by showing that indirect or vicarious 
contacts are more effective than direct contacts. 
Anothere promising candidate to overcome group-thinking is decategorization 
(Bettencourt et al., 1992; Brewer, 1996, 1997), which focuses on social identity and 
categorization processes. Decategorization aims to eliminate intergroup boundaries by 
reducing the salience of category membership and stressing out individual identity over 
group identity (e.g. emphasizing personal attributes) which enable more personalized, 
less homogeneous perceptions of in-group and out-group members. As a result, the 
long-term positive effects of decategorized contact are considered less useful and 
therefore less frequently used (Brewer, 1996; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Ensari & Miller, 
2001; Gaertner et al., 1993). Only a few developmental studies examine 
decategorization as a possible intervention method. For example, Cameron and Rutland 
(Cameron et al., 2006, 2011; Cameron & Rutland, 2006) used decategorization, dual 
identity and common in-group identity in hypothetical scenarios, but in combination 
with extended contact hypothesis in preschoolers as well as school children. 
Interestingly, dual identity intervention approach in combination with the extended 
contact approach was the most effective way.  
Taken all findings together, little is known about intergroup-bias and approaches 
to reduce them in early childhood. In particular, the direct and sole influence of 
decategorization without the combination with any other interventions and its impact to 
intergroup-bias has not yet been well explored. In most experimental designs, 
intergroup-bias and out-group prejudice are studied interchangeably. But there is much 
evidence that in-group favouritism and out-group derogation are separable phenomena 
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and that the origin of identification and attachment to in-groups is independent of 
intergroup conflict (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Paluck & Green, 2009). 
Hence, we try to disentangle these two phenomena of in-group favouritism and out-
group derogation.  
In the current study, we thus investigated preschoolers’ responsiveness to 
decategorization by measuring children’s prosocial behavior towards in-group and out-
group members with a dictator game. The dictator game has turned out to be an 
effective method as measurement of costly sharing behavior in resource allocation 
contexts with children (Benenson et al., 2007; Blake & Rand, 2010). Nevertheless, only 
a few studies used the dictator game in intergroup contexts, but they all showed robust 
results of in-group preference as a function of prosocial behavior (Benozio & 
Diesendruck, 2015; Bettencourt et al., 1992; Fehr et al., 2008; Over, 2018). We have 
decided to base the experimentally induced dimension of category differentiation on the 
stimulus "geographical proximity". Additionally, we intensified the categorization 
process by inserting positive social identity of the relevant in-group, whereby the 
individual’s knowledge belonging to certain social groups was combined together with 
positive emotions and values (Tajfel, 1969, 1982). A second stimulus "color" was used 
to make the identity of the category clearly visible to the children throughout the session 
(Bettencourt et al., 1992; Marcus-Newhall et al., 1993). Moreover, there is evidence that 
the cohesion within the in-group might be reduced, when the child interacts with a real 
interaction-partner by providing information that is contrary to the child's own attitude. 
Therefore, the children in our study were confronted with a hypothetical scenario in 
which they were asked to imagine their interaction partners (Crisp & Turner, 2009; 
Vezzali, Stathi, Crisp, et al., 2015). 
Overall, we predicted that when using a dictator game, preschool children would 
behave more prosocially towards the in-group than towards the out-group in a typical 
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intergroup context, but that in a decategorized context, their intergroup-bias would 
decrease, thus leading them to treat in-group and out-group individuals in a similar way. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
Eighty 5- to 6-year-old children (M = 72 months; 60 – 83 months; 40 girls) participated 
in the study. The participants were randomly assigned to two between-subjects 
conditions, with gender being evenly split (20 girls in each condition). Children were 
native German speakers, came from mixed socio-economic backgrounds from a large 
German city and were recruited via urban daycare centers and a museum in which 
testing took place. Parents provided written informed consent. Two additional children 
were tested, but excluded from the final sample due to experimenter error. 
4.2.2. Material 
A yellow and a purple pad were used for a preference test. Two pictures of a crowd of 
stick man in yellow and in purple visualized the two groups (in-group vs. out-group). 
Two ovals painted on transparent foils were used as stencils, one of them was marked 
with a small dot to clarify, which one belonged to the participant. Two purple and two 
yellow paper boxes were utilized to store the stickers. One box was labeled with a white 
sticker on which the name of the participant was written in order to clarify to whom the 
content belonged. Six smiley stickers in orange and six stickers in green were used in 
the dictator game. In the personal condition, eight small tags displayed the following 
information about the recipient: the name (in-group: Nils and Vanessa; out-group: Nisa 
and Modessa), the favorite sweet (pictures of chocolate and gummy bear) and the 
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favorite toy (pictures of teddy bear and stuffed cat). The experimental set-up included a 
table and two chairs. 
4.2.3. Design 
A two (recipient identity: personal vs. impersonal; between-participants) by two (group 
membership: in-group vs. out-group; within-participants) mixed-design was used. As 
dependent measure, we counted the number of stickers (out of six) the child shared with 
each recipient (in-group vs. out-group member). The recipients of the participants were 
gender matched. The participants received six smiley stickers of the same color in a 
constant sequence across two trials (green, orange). The order of colors in the 
preference test (yellow vs. purple first), the order in which groups were introduced (in-
group vs. out-group first), the trial order (member of in-group vs. out-group first), their 
preferences for sweets (chocolate vs. gummy bear) and toys (teddy bear vs. stuffed cat) 
were systematically varied. 
4.2.4. Procedure 
One experimenter conducted the study, which lasted roughly 10 minutes. The child and 
the experimenter sat vis-à-vis to each other at a table. The experiment started with a 
short warm-up phase, where the experimenter and the child played a puzzle game 
together in order to familiarize the child with the situation. 
All children were first given an introductory phase (color preference test and 
introduction of in-group and out-group) followed by a presentation and test phase across 
two trials. In the presentation phase, children were presented with the recipient (in-
group or out-group, within-participants condition), either in personalized or in 
impersonalized manner (between-participants condition). The trial ended with a test 
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phase in which children had the opportunity to share resources with the recipient 
(dictator game). The second trial then began once again with the presentation phase. 
In the preference test, the experimenter laid a yellow and a purple pad on the table 
and asked the child, "Look, which color do you prefer, purple or yellow?" After the 
child's decision, the experimenter acknowledged the child’s decision, “Great, you've 
chosen a wonderful color!”. Then she introduced the two different groups. Hence, two 
verbal cues, one referring to color (purple vs. yellow) and one referring to the group’s 
geographical proximity (own kindergarten vs. “Upendi”, far away) were used to 
establish the in-group/out-group distinction. To present the in-group, the experimenter 
placed a same-colored in-group picture on the child's preferred colored pad and said, 
"Imagine they're children from your kindergarten! Therefore, you are the X [child’s 
color preference: yellow or purple] group. And show me who do you want to be?" The 
experimenter marked the chosen stick man with the stencil. Then she familiarized the 
child with the out-group, placed the other colored group picture on the other pad and 
said: "These are children from another country. They are not from your kindergarten. 
They are Upendis and they come from far away. So they're the Y group [non-preferred 
color]." Afterwards, she introduced the child to the recipient, either in impersonal 
manner (focus on group membership) or in personal manner (focus on individuating 
information, name and personal preferences). In the impersonal-in-group condition, the 
experimenter said, "Look and he/she is also from your kindergarten, just like you." In 
the impersonal-out-group condition the child was told, "Look, and he/she is from 
Upendi, far away". The experimenter then marked the stick man from the corresponding 
recipient with a second stencil. In the personal condition, the procedure was the same, 
except that the child received more information about its recipient. The experimenter 
told, "Look, and this is [in-group: Nils/Vanessa vs. out-group: Nisa/Modessa], he/she 
also comes from [your kindergarten vs. Upendi]. [Nils/Vanessa vs. Nisa/Modessa] loves 
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[gummy bears vs. chocolate]. His/her favorite toy is a [cat vs. teddy bear]. The 
experimenter than marked the stick man from the corresponding recipient with a second 
stencil and placed a nametag and pictures with the sweet and toy next to the stick man. 
Afterwards the dictator game began. The experimenter fetched a box in the appropriate 
color (yellow or purple depending on the color of the in-group) and explained, "Look, 
this is your box, we'll stick your name on it". The experimenter placed the box next to 
the child’s stick man. "And this is the box of that child from [your kindergarten vs. 
Upendi]." Now the second box (in-group color vs. out-group color) was placed next to 
the recipient’s stick man. The child received six smiley stickers as piles in the middle 
between the two pads. The experimenter explained: "Look, here are six stickers! These 
are your stickers. Now, you can decide how many stickers you keep to yourself or give 
it to the child from [your kindergarten/Upendi vs. Nils/Vanessa/Nisa/Modessa]. You 
can keep them all or give them away. In addition, the stickers you want to keep come in 
your box here. The stickers you want to give to the child from [your 
kindergarten/Upendi vs. Nils/Vanessa/Nisa/Modessa], are coming into this box here." In 
order to prevent social desirability, the experimenter pretended to write something down 
and turned away. As soon as the child completed the decision, the experimenter turned 
back and put aside both boxes and the recipient's material. After that, the second round 
began. If the recipient was currently part of the in-group, then the second recipient was 
the out-group member and vice versa. The experimenter introduced the second recipient 
and then played once again the dictator game with the child. 
4.2.5. Statistical Analysis 
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.6.1. (R Core Team, 2019). To account for 
the non-independence of the data (i.e., repeated observations per child), we used 
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generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) with gaussian error structure and identity 
link function (Baayen et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2014). Initial models included as fixed 
effects the predictor variables recipient identity (personal vs. impersonal), group 
membership (in-group vs. out-group), and their interaction, the control variables gender 
and trial order (z-transformed), and participant ID as a random intercept. First, the 
combined significance of the predictor variables (i.e., main and interaction effects) was 
tested by comparing the fit of the full model (including the predictor variables, control 
variables, and random effect) with the fit of a null model that only contained the control 
variables and random effect using a likelihood ratio test (LRT; Dobson, 2002). The 
approach of testing the overall full model against a null model helps to protect against 
Type I error inflation arising from models comprising more than one predictor variable 
(Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). This full-null model comparison was significant, χ
2
(3) 
= 10.35, p = .016. Next, effects of interest and planned comparisons were tested using 
LRTs. Preliminary analyses found no effects of gender and trial order. Unstandardized 
parameter estimates (b), standard errors (SE), and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were 
obtained from the respective full model. Cohen’s d (d) was computed to estimate effect 
sizes. 
4.3. Results 
As predicted, we found a significant interaction effect between recipient identity and 
group membership, χ
2
(1) = 4.87, p = .027, b = 0.55, SE = 0.26, CI [0.03, 1.07], d = 0.47 
which is a small effect size according to Cohen’s conventions. Planned comparisons 
revealed that children shared significantly more stickers with the in-group member (M = 
2.28, SD = 1.34) than with the out-group member (M = 1.7, SD = 1.18) in the 
impersonal condition, χ
2
(1) = 7.82, p = .005, b = 0.58, SE = 0.2, CI [0.18, 0.97], but that 
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they shared equally (in-group: M = 1.75, SD = 1.13; out-group: M = 1.73, SD = 1.2) in 
the personal condition, χ
2
(1) = 0.03, p = .866, b = – 0.03, SE = 0.17, CI [– 0.37, 0.31] 
(see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Mean number of stickers shared with in-group and out-group members as a function of 
condition. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
4.4. Discussion 
Overall, the present study demonstrated the effectiveness of decategorization to reduce 
intergroup bias in preschool children. First, we show that in a typical intergroup context, 
children favor their own group over the out-group by sharing more stickers with in-
group versus out-group members. Thus, we have replicated earlier results regarding 
intergroup bias in early childhood (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011). Second, when presenting 
group members in a decategorized manner, that is when the recipients were presented as 
individuals with certain preferences for toys and sweets, intergroup bias was 
diminished. In this case, children shared the same number of stickers with in-group as 
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well as out-group members. The results of our study are thus consistent with those from 
social psychology as well as developmental research (Bettencourt et al., 1992; Brewer, 
1996, 1997; Cameron et al., 2006; Cameron & Rutland, 2006).  
A further question arises in terms of the distribution pattern in the dictator game. 
Overall, the children acted rather selfishly than fair towards their recipients, regardless 
of group membership. As results revealed, children shared on average approximately 
one third of their resources. The only exception was children's preference of their own 
group in the impersonal intergroup situation, where they divided significantly more 
stickers to their group, but still remained under equal split. A possible explanation for 
this pattern is that preschool children simply show more egocentrism than adults do. On 
the other hand, various studies have shown that even preschool children are able to act 
fairly and punish even those who do not adhere to such norm (Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004; Paulus & Moore, 2014). A better explanation is provided by game 
theoretical investigations in adulthood, where similar distribution pattern were found. 
Here, a meta-analysis of the dictator game revealed an average payout ratio of 28.3% to 
the recipient in first-person distributions (Engel, 2011). Moreover, in anonymous first 
person distributions is generally no willing to share resources equally for personal cost 
reasons. Indications from minimal group studies support this explanation, where 
participants who did third party rather than first party distributions, are more willing to 
act in the sense of fairness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this context, the question arises 
how the children would have reacted to a third person distribution task, where they 
distribute stickers between in-group and out-group members without personal cost. This 
could be the subject of a possible follow-up study.  
Interrestingly, our results revealed, but at least on a descriptive level, that children 
shared only more resources with the anonymous in-group member as compared to all 
other conditions. These results give rise for further future directions. In particular, these 
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results might indicate that in-group favoritism and out-group derogation are separate 
phenomena and that the origin of identification and attachment to in-groups is 
independent of intergroup conflict. It would be interesting to investigate whether 
preeschool children show in-group bias, but not active forms of out-group deviation. 
Moreover, in-group preference could than rather be seen as a platform for possible later 
developing out-group derogation such as prejudice or discrimination, which under 
special circumstances could fully unfold in the course of development. These 
considerations also support the findings of Brewers (Brewer, 1999) explanation of 
intergroup bias which is more interpreted as in-group bias but not active forms of out-
group derogation. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) also support this theory, as in-
group favoritism arises with positive revaluation of the in-group as being part of the 
self-concept to heighten the own self-esteem. This process does not necessarily lead to 
the devaluation of the out-group. As a result, in-group members are than treated more 
positively as part of the self-concept regardless of the other groups. Hence, future 
investigations could try to disentangle these two phenomena of in-group favoritism and 
out-group derogation in early childhood. 
A limitation of the study is a transfer of our findings in real life situations. First, 
decategorization is a suitable measure as a laboratory experiment, but further research is 
needed in the field. Our experiment was based on arbitrary and artificial categories, but 
we do not yet know what it is about deeply rooted prejudices, e.g. towards minorities as 
well as short lasting or long lasting effects. Second, it seems virtually impossible to 
completely deactivate category memberships in real life. Group formation arises 
automatically and switched on and of dependent of the situation, because it offers many 
advantages for the individual belonging the a certain small group (Brewer & Caporael, 
2006; Park & Judd, 2005; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tomasello, 2016). On the long run, the 
aim should be to promote cooperation between groups without feeling threatened and to 
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recognize and appreciate diversity, tolerance and positive qualities of each group 




5. General Discussion 
The present dissertation aimed to investigate the role of children’s prosocial motivation 
in the ontogeny of morality. There is both theoretical reason and empirical evidence to 
propose that altruism and empathic concern are decisive motivational factors of 
morality, which the moral sentimentalists David Hume and Adam Smith have described 
as sympathy for the other in need, not only in adulthood, but also in the development of 
morality (Batson, 2010; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Jensen et al., 2014; Nichols, 2002, 2004; 
Roughley & Bayertz, 2019). However, past developmental research has mostly focused 
separately on the pre-moral development of childen's first-party prosociality and their 
third-party understanding of moral norms (Tomasello, 2016, 2018). Accordingly, 
children in their second year of life develop empathic concern and sympathy for others 
in need in prosocial situations (Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2012). Furthermore, recent 
findings suggest that 18-month-old children already show some rudimentary forms of 
norm understanding at least in dyadic conventional situations. This rudimentary norm 
understanding is interpreted as second-personal normative expectations (Schmidt et al., 
2019). Moreover, 3-year-old children not only have descriptive expectations about 
morality, but also normative ones as suggested by their enforcement of moral norms as 
unaffected bystanders (Rakoczy et al., 2016; Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011). 
The relation between prosociality and morality, however, in particular, the prosocial 
motivational source of the early sense of morality, remains unclear. Thus in three 
studies, I addressed this topic by investigating the developmental origins of morality 
(Study 1), the underlying prosocial motivation for children’s normative appreciation of 
morality (Study set 2), and by examining the scope of morality (Study 3). 
First, I will briefly summarize the main findings of the three empirical studies presented 
in the current thesis. Thereafter, a more general discussion of the results and their 
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contributions to the three stated questions will be outlined. After highlighting the 
theoretical impact of my work, some limitations and propositions for future research 
will be described and possible implications will be briefly touched upon before drawing 
some final conclusions. 
5.1. Summary 
Study 1 investigated the developmental origins of morality in 18-month-old infants. In 
an eye-tracking paradigm, anticipatory looking and pupil dilation were used to examine 
whether infants differentiate between prototypical moral (harmful) and conventional 
(harmless) violations. In a between-subjects-design, children watched the very same 
video clip whose audio stream differed according to condition. In the first two 
conditions, an instructor told an observer to destroy a picture with tool A (conventional 
violation) or with tool B (no violation), whereas in the third (moral violation) condition, 
the instructor forbade the observer to destroy the picture at all. In all three conditions, 
the observer then grasped tool B and destroyed the picture, which led to the three 
different violation situations. Results demonstrated that infants showed a larger relative 
increase in pupil dilation in response to a moral violation than to a conventional 
violation. Moreover, infants differentiated between two types of conventional norm 
situations in their anticipatory looking based on prescribed actions.  
These findings suggest that 18-month-old infants have third-party descriptive 
expectations about the distinction between conventional and moral violation situations. 
Moreover, they provide the first evidence that empathic concern may be a decisive 
capacity for the distinction between these two violation situations. 
Study set 2 looked at the underlying prosocial motivation for the normative 
appreciation of morality in 3-year-old children. In three experiments, children were 
given a third-party fairness task (which varied across the experiments) and two different 
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prosocial tasks. A spontaneous protest paradigm was used to investigate, whether 
children enforce fairness norms (for a conceptual overview, see Schmidt & Rakoczy, 
2018, 2019). In Experiment 1, children protested and corrected unequal (but not equal) 
allocations, suggesting a normative understanding of third-party fairness. Experiment 2 
assessed whether children’s normative expectations about fairness have a moral 
(authority-independent) dimension. Thus, children observed a distributor who followed 
(unequal condition) or violated (equal condition) an authority’s command to allocate 
resources unequally. Again, despite the authority’s dictate to act unequally, children 
protested more against unequal versus equal allocations. In Experiment 3, results show 
that children enforced fairness norms by altruistic punishment. While in Experiments 1 
and 2 there was a positive relation of protest behavior and emotional sharing (empathic 
concern), in Experiment 3 children’s third-party altruistic punishment was associated 
with their own costly sharing behavior (altruism). 
Overall, results of Study set 2 provide evidence that young children’s third-party 
normative expectations about fairness are closely related to their own prosocial 
behavior. More generally, this work may help better understand to what extent the 
ontogeny of fairness norms can be characterized as moral in that it is associated with 
children’s developing concern for the welfare of others in different contexts. 
In Study 3, I explored the scope of morality in 5- to 6-year-olds in a typical 
intergroup context. Here, I investigated whether decategorization – a candidate 
mechanism to overcome in-group bias by emphasizing the individual person – would 
lead preschoolers to treat in-group and out-group members equally when sharing 
resources in a dictator game. I found that preschoolers shared more resources with an 
in-group than with an out-group recipient when social category membership was 
emphasized. When individuating information was emphasized (decategorization), 
however, children shared the same with in-group and out-group individuals. These 
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findings suggest that the presentation of out-group members as individuals may be a 
powerful tool to reduce in-group bias and to foster equal treatment (an important moral 
category) of in-group and out-group members in preschool children. 
5.2. Developmental Origins of Morality 
The main finding of the first study was that a distinction between situations that are 
considered prototypical moral and conventional violations begins much earlier in the 
development than previously thought. More specifically, results revealed that the ability 
to feel sympathy may be critical for the development of the moral-conventional 
distinction and that 18-month-old infants, at minimum, have third-party descriptive 
expectations about that distinction. 
Using anticipatory looking, results show that infants distinguished between two 
types of conventional situations within a dyadic interaction (between an instructor and 
an observer). More precisely, these situations consisted of two mutually exclusive game 
rules that were explained by the instructor, namely that the observer should tear apart a 
picture with a certain tool, while not using the other tool, which – later in context – 
leads to a no violation or a violation situation. As predicted, in each conventional 
situation, the children expected the observer to use the prescribed tool. This finding 
suggests that infants possess a third-party descriptive understanding of conventional 
rule agreements. Furthermore, infants showed a larger relative increase in pupil dilation 
in response to a moral violation situation than in response to a conventional violation 
situation. No difference was found between a conventional violation and a no violation 
situation. These results demonstrate that children were more physiologically aroused 
when witnessing a moral violation, which is interpreted as affective arousal due to the 
severity of the moral violation (empathic concern, sympathy). 
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It is important to note that there may be other causes of pupil dilation correlating 
with physiological arousal (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Pletti et al., 2017). To exclude 
such alternative interpretations, I sought to control for the various sensory and cognitive 
efforts. First, to control for luminance, the same video material across all conditions was 
used. Second, cognitive efforts caused, for instance, by different syntax structures were 
controlled for by using the same sentence structures with the same number of syllables, 
speech volume and timing across all three conditions. Furthermore, on a semantic level, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that the moral violation should be cognitively more 
complex than the other two conditions. On the contrary, one could argue that the moral 
violation situation should be easier to process than the other two situations (no violation 
and conventional violation), since simply the use of both tools is prohibited and no 
action should be performed at all. Another indication is that no differences were found 
in pupil dilation between conventional and no violation situations. This speaks against 
pupil size differences being due to cognitive effort, as pupil size would have varied 
based on the increased cognitive effort needed to process an unexpected as opposed to 
an expected action. However, that was not the case. This and the fact that the children 
had increased physiological arousal only in the moral violation condition seems good 
evidence for increased affective arousal and not for cognitive effort. 
There are several reasons these findings contribute to the developmental origins of 
morality. First, the findings of the eye-tracking paradigm extend previous language-
driven work in interview studies as well as behavioral studies, which suggest that 
children at the age of 3 reliably distinguish between non-arbitrary moral norms (e.g., 
against harming others) and more arbitrary conventional norms ( e.g., game rules, dress 
code; e.g., Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012; Smetana et al., 2018; Smetana & 
Braeges, 1990). In line with social domain theory (Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 
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1983, 2006), the results show that even 18-month-old infants were capable of 
distinguishing between moral and conventional violation situations.  
Second, the findings are consistent with psychological, physiological and 
philosophical explanations of morality (Killen & de Waal, 2000; Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Nichols, 2002; Smetana, 1984; Smetana et al., 2014; Tomasello, 2016; Turiel, 
1983, 2006). Violations of moral norms are considered more serious and punishable 
than conventional norm violations because they take the welfare of others into account. 
A plethora of studies have shown such interrelations between morality and other-
regarding concerns (empathic concern, sympathy) in children and adults (Decety et al., 
2012; Decety & Yoder, 2016; Eisenberg et al., 2014; Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 
2012; Jensen et al., 2014; Lamm et al., 2019; Nichols, 2002; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; 
Svetlova et al., 2010; Vaish et al., 2009). Moreover, a large number of experimental 
studies have shown that such affective arousal is associated with an empathic concern 
for the victim and leads to an altruistic motivation to show prosocial behavior (Batson 
& Shaw, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1990; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Hepach, 2017; Hepach 
et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2014; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Vaish et al., 2009).  
Third, the current results complement the findings of a recent study that revealed 
that 18-month-old infants have an early rudimentary form of norm understanding at 
least in dyadic interactions, specifically of how "we" (a dyadic of "you" and "me") 
ought to do something, which is called second-personal normativity (Schmidt et al., 
2019). There is further evidence that 18-month-old children are not fully capable of 
applying and regulating the self-another-distinction, in particular on the cognitive level, 
which is associated with the still undeveloped mentalizing, executive and inhibitory 
functions (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Milward & Sebanz, 2016; Steinbeis, 2016).  
Taken together, in accordance with the above-mentioned numerous theoretical 
reasons and empirical evidence on the important role of prosocial motivation in 
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understanding morality, Study 1 provides further information on Tomasello's model 
(Tomasello, 2016). In other words, not only might prosociality be a crucial precursor for 
the development of morality, but it also appears to be an important building block that is 
more closely related to the (at least descriptive) understanding of moral situations than 
previously thought. Thus, the ability to feel sympathy may be critical for the 
development of the moral-conventional distinction and 18-month-old infants, at 
minimum, have third-party descriptive expectations about that distinction. These 
findings can be interpreted as a precursor of morality rather than a full-fledged, agent-
independent, group-minded social norm understanding, which develops at the age of 
three (Tomasello, 2018). 
5.3. The Relationship between Prosociality and Morality 
The main result of the second study set was that 3-year-old children understand 
fairness as a moral normative notion. Moreover, a 3-year-old's sense of fairness is 
related to prosocial tendencies and other-regard, especially sympathy and altruism – that 
is, being interested in and concerned about others’ well-being and motivated to act 
accordingly. 
In three experiments, results revealed that children enforce third-party fairness 
norms as unaffected bystanders, even without receiving instructions of acting fairly, that 
they protest and intervene against injustice even when an authority dictates inequality, 
and finally that they are even willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to punish 
unfair behavior. Moreover, children's third-party normative expectations of fairness are 
closely linked to their own prosocial behavior, particularly to their concern for the 




Taken together, Study set 2 specifically investigated the mechanisms of the 
developmental understanding of moral norms, in particular the relationship between 
children’s first-party prosociality and their third-party normative expectations about 
fairness. 
There are several reasons these findings contribute to understanding the relationship 
between prosociality and morality. First, only a few studies have investigated the 
interrelation between (pre)moral capacities and early prosocial motivations (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville et al., 2013).  
Second, the developmental findings of this thesis contribute to the philosophical 
theory of moral sentimentalism (David Hume and Adam Smith) as well as to Batson’s 
psychological model of altruistic motivation (Batson, 2010; Batson & Shaw, 1991; 
Nichols, 2004; Waldmann et al., 2012). Thus, theoretically, the current findings 
complement Tomasello's model, in which self-other equivalence is assumed to be the 
main driving force of morality and, in particular, of fairness considerations, rather than 
altruism and empathic concern for the welfare of others. Moreover, Tomasello regarded 
children’s prosocial altruistic motivation (empathic concern, sympathy) as a pre-moral 
first step to the later agent-neutral normative understanding of morality (Tomasello, 
2016). Thus, in his point ov view, both constructs are seen as more separated than 
interrelated. Study set 2 therefore provides further information for Tomasello's model, 
since prosociality and in particular empathic concern and altruism has proven to be an 
important mechanism even in the case of the development of an agent-neutral norm 
understanding of morality. 
Third, the current results of Study Set 2 support the social domain theoratical 
approach (Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983, 2008) by showing that not only 
adults but also children consider fairness a moral norm by 3 years of age, at least along 
the criterion of "authority- contingency ". Moreover, since these previous results stem 
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mainly from hypothetical interview scenarios, the currents results give further evidence 
by using a third-party protest paradigm. Thus, 3-year-old children showed not only, that 
they are able to adequately adhere to moral norms, but also show third-party norm 
enforcements, which is considered a key normative understanding of morality, because 
it showed children understanding the normative force (the “oughtness”) in an agent-
neutral way (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Furthermore, the 
current work extents previous behavioral findings, which suggested that preschool 
children have descriptive, but not normative, expectations about equal resource 
allocation (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo et al., 2016). Therefore, the findings 
underpin important findings of previous behavioral (protest) studies that show that 3-
year-old children are generally capable of intervening and protesting against norm 
violations, for instance conventional game rule violations (Rakoczy et al., 2008) and 
moral transgressions (Rakoczy et al., 2016; Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011). In 
addition, the results are consistent with previous findings showing third-party costly 
punishment behavior in preschoolers following moral violations (Kenward & Östh, 
2012; Krasnow et al., 2016; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011).  
Overall, the current findings of Study set 2 may help better understand to what 
extent the ontogeny of fairness norms can be characterized as moral, in that it is 
associated with children’s developing concern for the welfare of others in different 
contexts. 
5.4. Scope of Morality 
The main finding of the third study was that 5-to 6-year-old children treat in-group and 
out-group members equally in a moral normative sense of fairness. Moreover, the 
present study demonstrated the effectiveness of decategorization to reduce intergroup 
bias in preschool children. First, I showed that in a typical intergroup context, children 
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favor their own group over the out-group by sharing more stickers with in-group versus 
out-group members. Second, when presenting group members in a decategorized 
manner, that is when the recipients were presented as individuals with certain 
preferences for toys and sweets, intergroup bias was diminished. In this case, children 
shared the same number of stickers with in-group and out-group members. 
There are several reasons these findings contribute to the scope of morality. First, 
the results showed that preschool children at the ages of 5 and 6 are already susceptible 
to intergroup distinction. This complements earlier results regarding intergroup bias in 
early childhood (Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015; Chalik & Dunham, 2018; Dunham et 
al., 2011; Misch et al., 2016; Over, 2018; Rutland et al., 2010, 2015; Sierksma et al., 
2018).  
Second, the current findings provide further evidence for approaches, which stated 
that the motivational and normative forces of mutual altruism and cooperation are 
limited in scope to their in-group (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Fiske, 2000; Tomasello, 
2016). That is, people need obligatory interdependence within a certain small group to 
live together peacefully and in order to survive in competition with physiologically 
dominant animals or other rival groups. Thus, a relatively small, distinct in-group most 
effectively provide loyalty, trust and cooperation, where the chance of being exploited 
is relatively low (Tomasello, 2016). In line with that, the identification with the relevant 
in-group is at the same time coupled with a social comparison with other opposing out-
groups, to which one automatically does not belong. This typically leads to social 
categorisation and intergroup distinction, accompanied by positive emotional 
attachment and consensus among members of the same group (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). My findings complements, that social categorization processes even 
under trivial criteria (e.g., group color yellow vs. purple) are sufficient enough to trigger 
in-group/out-group distinction (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) in preschoolers. 
102 
 
Third, the results of Study 3 are consistent with those from social psychology as 
well as with research of intervention methods in adults and school-children, indicating 
that decategrorization is a suitable method to restore equal treatment of both in-group 
and out-group members (Bettencourt et al., 1992; Brewer, 1996, 1997; Cameron et al., 
2006; Cameron & Rutland, 2006). This extends the scope of morality, in that not only 
in-group members as opposed to out-group members are more prefered (in-group bias), 
but decategorization leads to overcome this bias by showing equal treatment of both 
group members. Thus, the development of equality in integroup contexts is not only an 
important capacity for a full-blown understanding of fairness (e.g., Rawls, 1999) but 
also important to overcome discrimination and predjudice, even at preschool years 
(Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014). 
Overall, the findings suggests that even preschool children at the age of 5- to 6 are 
not only vulnerable to intergroup distinction, but I could also show results to overcome 
this bias, which leads to equal treatment of in-group and out-group members. 
5.5. Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
The present thesis offered new insights into the prosocial roots of children’s developing 
morality. However, further research is needed to unravel the phenomenon of young 
children's prosocial motivation to understand, adhere to, and enforce moral norms. 
Therefore, in the following I will discuss the limitations of the results of each study, 
raise some future research questions and point out implications. 
Study 1 examined whether 18-month-old children distinguish between 
conventional and moral-norm violations. However, further research is needed to 
disentangle the phenomenon of infants’ capacity to distinguish between moral and 
conventional situations. I provided first evidence using a novel eye-tracking paradigm, 
but anticipatory gaze behavior and pupil dilation are indirect measures of children's 
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capacity to distinguish between conventional and moral violations. Future research 
should use a combination of eye-tracking measures and behavioral tasks to investigate 
the relation between children's first-party behavior (empathic concern, altruism) and 
third-party descriptive expectations of morally relevant situations. In addition, the 
present paradigm was limited to certain norm violations, such as property rights. 
Examining different moral violations (e.g., fairness, other harm-related situations) 
would complement the current findings. Furthermore, there is much evidence that 
witnessing social interactions, in particular between the victim and the perpetrator, is a 
crucial factor in investigating children’s understanding of morally relevant situations; in 
particular being concerned for the victim and/or being more emotionally aroused 
because of the desire to punish the perpetrator (e.g., Hepach, 2017; Hepach et al., 2017; 
Vaish et al., 2009). However, the first study focusses on the tool use. An interesting 
question for future research would be whether children exhibit greater pupil dilation 
when looking at the victim (empathic concern) or at the perpetrator (desire to punish). A 
further interesting aspect to explore would be the influence of individual differences on 
the relationship between children’s prosocial arousal (empathic concern for the victim) 
and their descriptive expectations, when withnessing different moral situations. Finally, 
a gaze-contingency paradigm could shed further light on whether infants are both, able 
to possess third-party describtive expectations, and to punish the perpetrator through 
gaze control (norm enforcement). 
Study 2 demonstrated that 3-year-old children understand fairness as a moral 
normative notion. Moreover, clear evidence about the relation between children’s 
prosocial motivation (empathic concern, altruism) and their third-party moral norm 
enforcement was found. Thus, these results are specific for fairness norms, but it would 
be interesting to investigate other types of moral norms, for instance harm-related 
issues, as well. Moreover, results revealed that 3-year-old children show a normative 
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understanding of fairness at least at a specific criterion (authority independency) of 
Turiel’s (1983, 2006) theoretical account, but other criterions such as generalizability 
are also necessary to explore. As a future direction, normative expectations about 
fairness as well as their relationship to children’s prosocial motivation could be 
examined in an intergroup context. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore the 
relation between children’s prosocial motivation and other fairness considerations such 
as merit or need. Finally, a closer look at the relation between other capacities, such as 
intelligence, executive functions, inhibition or theory of mind, and children’s moral 
norm understanding would be interesting to investigate. 
Results from Experiment 3 of Study set 2 are ambiguous and give rise to further 
possible investigation. On the one hand, the explicit question (i.g., “Is the distribution 
good or bad?”) was useful to measure whether the children understand fairness correctly 
as sharing resources equally. However, we could not investigate what the children who 
judged unfair distribution as good would do in the costly sharing task, because we did 
not give them the opportunity to perform this task. Moreover, it is not yet clear what the 
children’s motivation was, who answered the explicit question not fully wrong but 
mixed (i.g., an unequal distribution was judged as good and in other trials was judged as 
bad). It might be that they played strategically based on egotistical motivation, but 
posses normative fairness considerations, and simply were not willing to sacrifice own 
resources to foster equal treatment. Furthermore, we conducted a paradigm which could 
not fully separate retributive (i.e., taking resources away to punish the perpetrator) from 
restorative justice considerations (i.e. take it from the perpertrator and give it to the 
victim back to restore justice as a moral norm). It might be interesting to examine 
children’s behavior in a pure restorative justice situation. A future study could examine 
how children understand the sense of justice at no personal cost by allowing them to 
take resources away from the perpetrator to give to the victim. It would also be 
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interesting to investigate whether younger children also understand restorative justice. 
For example, an eye-tracking paradigm could be used here as a language-free paradigm, 
and specifically a gaze-contingency paradigm. Children could then interactively 
redistribute resources. 
Study 3 revealed that decategorization is a suitable intervention method to foster 
equal treatment of in-group and out-group members. In this context, the question arises 
how children would react to a third-person distribution task, in which they distribute 
stickers directy between in-group and out-group members at no personal cost. 
Moreover, interesting descriptive findings were found regarding the intergroup bias and 
the direction in which it was removed. Following the distribution pattern in all four 
conditions, it seems that children distributed more stickers to the recipient of their in-
group in the impersonal categorization condition than in the other three remaining 
conditions. Hence, it could be that children at this age show a decrease in prosociality 
towards in-group members but not an increase in prosocial behavior towards the out-
group members. Future research could investigate whether children show an in-group 
bias but not yet active forms of out-group derogations. Study 3 revealed the scope of 
morality in an intergroup context, but what about the relationship between children’s 
prosocial motivation and their moral norm understanding in an intergroup context? It 
might be that children not only show an intergroup bias in a minimal group paradigm, 
but also process differences in their prosocial motivation (less empathic concern for an 
out-group victim/more concern for in-group victim). And furthermore, the question 
arises whether children are equally concerned when using an intervention method such 
as decategorization. Results revealed significant effects on specific in-group as well as 
out-group members, even when drawing them anonymously. However, it might be that 
the other group members are still homogenized (i.e., I like Nisa from the purple group, 
but I still hate the purple group). However, it is not yet clear whether the findings that 
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are related to specific individual group members can be extended to the whole group or 
to new in-group/ out-group members. In the future, a generalization effect should 
therefore be investigated. A further limitation of the study is a transfer of our findings to 
real life situations. First, decategorization is a suitable measure as a laboratory 
experiment, but further research is needed in the field. The experiment was based on 
arbitrary and artificial categories, but we do not yet know how it is with deeply rooted 
prejudices, e.g. towards minorities or whether effects are short or long lasting.  
Finally, what implications can be derived from the results of the present work? In 
Study 1 and Study set 2, the importance of the relationship between children's altruistic 
motivation (empathic concern, sympathy) and their understanding of morally relevant 
situations was found, even at an early preschool age. The question therefore arises as to 
what decisive role empathic concern might play for the parenting style at home, the 
educational style in kindergarten or at school. Since children also seem to have an 
intrinsic altruistic motivation, it might be useful not to undermine their motivation. In 
the third study, the effects of inequality in an intergroup context were examined. I 
demonstrated how equality can be restored through appropriate intervention methods 
such as decategorization. Thus, suitable intervention methods in school as well as in 
kindergarten are of crucial importance to help children develop into moral autonomous 






The current dissertation provides a novel overview of the prosocial roots of children's 
developing morality. In particular, the present findings suggest that the ability to feel 
sympathy helps 18-month-old infants distinguish moral from conventional norm 
violations, at least having third-party descriptive expectations. Moreover, 3-year-old 
children’s concern for the welfare of others in different contexts of fairness revealed 
that the ontogeny of fairness norms can be characterized as moral. Finally, the 
presentation of out-group members as individuals may be a powerful tool to reduce  
in-group bias and foster equal treatment in a moral sense of in-group and out-group 
members in 5- to 6-year-old preschool children. However, further research is certainly 
needed to unravel the phenomenon of young children's prosocial motivation to 
understand, adhere to, and enforce moral norms. 
Taken together, the current dissertation adds to the literature on the ontogeny of 
moral norm-psychology. The present thesis has revealed that prosociality and morality 
are not only separate developmental steps in the ontogeny of morality, but that both 
constructs are more closely related than previously thought. Moreover, prosocial 
(altruistic) motivation, especially empathic concern and sympathy, plays an important 
role in children’s developing into full-blown moral agents. 
To return to my story from the beginning of the thesis. What can I conclude from 
my experience with the woman who helped me and from the insights I gained from my 
work? The prosocial motivation behind moral behavior is an important aspect in 
determining whether someone acts out of moral (good and right) reasons, not only in 
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